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URBAN RENEWAL IN THE CRUCIBLE OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW*
Henry W. McGee, Jr.**
An agency is not an island entire of itself. It is one of the many
rooms in the magnificent mansion of the law. The very subordination
of the agency to judicial jurisdiction is intended to proclaim the
premise that each agency is to be brought into harmony 'with the
totality of the law; the law as it is found in the statute at hand, the
statute book at large, the principles and conceptions of the "common
law," and the ultimate guarantees associated with the Constitution.'
INTRODUCTION
MR . Justice Douglas' ringing affirmation of the "well-nigh con-
clusive" 2 nature of legislative determination of public use in
urban renewal programs is undergoing the process of qualification that
has characterized subsequent judicial application of a more famous
Supreme Court phrase of the following year-"with all deliberate
speed." 3 The older notion that "urban renewal planning generally is
not reviewable" 4 is rapidly eroding. There has emerged a public and
judicial consciousness that for billions of dollars "the Urban Renewal
Agency has succeeded in materially reducing the supply of low-cost
housing in American cities. Like highways and streets, the program has
ripped through the neighborhoods of the poor, powered by the right
of eminent domain." 5 As Professor Frank Michelman has written:
* This Article was written in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
of Doctor of the Science of Law in the Faculty of Law, Columbia University.
**Acting Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles. B.S., 1954, North-
western University; J.D., 1957, DePaul University; LL.M., 1970, Columbia University.
Member, Illinois Bar.
1 L. JAM, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMNISTRATIVE ACTION 590 (1965).
2 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
3 Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
4 Note, Family Relocation in Urban Renewal, 82 HARv. L. REv. 864, 892 (1969).
5 S. GRF,E URBAN RENEWAL AND AaEsm cl' CrnEs: THE DILEMMA oF DEaocRAc
INwRFzm w 1 (1965).
The national program has resulted in the destruction of four dwelling units
for each unit built. This is, to be sure, based on projects in being and not projects
completed. But even when only the latter are considered, the cost is two
destroyed for one built-and these completed projects probably reflect dispro-
portionately the earlier program that allowed only 10 percent nonresidential. The
new housing built usually cannot be available to the population that lived there
[ 826 1
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[T]he violent unfairness of many such [urban renewal] operations is
manifest. The social gains hoped for from some urban redevelopment
programs, while plausible enough to override any "public purpose"
objection, nevertheless depend on a still controversial conception.
Easily identified, relatively small numbers of people are being handed
a distinctly disproportionate and frequently excruciating share of the
cost of whatever social gain is involved .... Altogether, the spectacle
of uncompensated dislocations under these circumstances is an op-
pressive one.6
Professor Michelman's protest stands in vivid and ironic contrast with
the assurances and prophecies of an earlier year that slum clearance
programs were the panacea for urban ills.1
The results of urban renewal programs challenged the traditional
liberal assumptions that "social readjustment through legislation" 8 could
best be achieved if judicial review of these projects was kept at a mini-
mum. The resulting debate over the efficacy of judicial activism in this
area cut more deeply than merely an academic analysis of constitutional
and jurisprudential issues. While commentators noted the discriminatory
aspects of most projects, 9 the political, social and economic realities of
before. It must rent at higher prices. Thus, old inhabitants are unable to return to
the redeveloped or upgraded areas.
Id. at 56.
6 Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations
of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HAIv. L. Rlv. 1165, 1255 (1967).
7 Early advocates of urban renewal claimed
that slum clearance and the provision of sanitary, low-rent housing [would] de-
crease danger of epidemics, raise general public health, reduce crime, cut juvenile
delinquency, reduce immorality, lower economic waste by reducing health, police
and fire protection costs, make better citizens, eliminate fire hazards, increase
general land values in the vicinity, cut the accident rate, and prevent the can-
cerous spread of the slums to uninfected areas.
McDougal & Mueller, Public Purpose in Public Housing, 52 YA L.J. 42, 47-48 (1942).
8F. FaANKF-=uR, MR. JusncE Ho.xass NDm Ti Sur'azams CoURT 72 (Atheneum ed.
1965).
9 The coalition among liberals, planners, mayors, businessmen, and real estate
interests which originally made renewal politically so irresistible has begun to fall
apart. Liberals, who still see the rehabilitation of the central city as a prime goal
for government, have begun to have doubts, particularly about redevelopment that
involves wholesale clearance by bulldozers. They are disturbed by charges from
many Negro leaders-whom liberals are accustomed to regarding as their natural
allies-that liberals have aided and abetted a program which under the guise of
slum clearance is really a program of Negro clearance.
Wilson, Planning and Politics: Citizen Participation in Urban Renewal, in UBmA
RENEWAL: THe REcoRD AND Tm CoNTRovERsY 407-08 (J. Wilson ed. 1966). See also
M. MA-ESON & E. BANFIEu), POLmcs, PLANNING AND THE PUBLic hqNTRsr 23 (1968):
As some conservatives backed public housing, some liberals who had fought for
it for many years lost interest and went into other activities; their places in the
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programs that have been a significant factor in fundamentally altering
the traditional relationships between local, state and federal govern-
ments" (with implications for rich and poor alike) were sooner or later
bound to sweep the judiciary into the vortex of public controversy.
As in the jurisprudential development of other momentous issues, it
is difficult to fix the precise point at which the rising tide of public dis-
satisfaction spills over into judicial pronouncement. A case that appears
to be a bold new breakthrough is often but the "logical culmination of a
gradual process of erosion." 12 It is thus important to consider the con-
text, legislative as well as political, in which the shifts in judicial atti-
housing agencies were taken by bureaucrats whose concern was not to win
acceptance for controversial goals, but merely to attain goals that had been agreed
upon.
A recent article has called the collapse of the liberal coalition
a heart-breaking and mind-muddling experience. Now, any liberal politician is in
a situation where he has to choose between the support of organized labor and
the support of the black community. And, on traditional liberal principles, such
a choice is simply impossible.
Kristol & Weaver, Who Knows New York-and Other Notes on a Mixed-up City,
THE Pu Ic INTEREsT 41, 59 (No. 16, Summer 1969).
10 Urban renewal occupies a unique place in American political experience in two
senses: first, it has increasingly sought to involve the participation of citizens in
affected neighborhoods (in addition to their representatives on city councils), and
second, it has been one of the programs that have begun to change the shape of
American federalism by emphasizing direct federal-city relations instead of the
earlier pattern of federal-state relations.
Wilson, Introduction to URBAN REulwAL.: Tim REcoRD AND THE CONTROVERSY at xviii
(J. Wilson ed. 1966). For an extended discussion of the novel organizational demands
on city administrations, see Duggar, The Relation of Local Government Structure to
Urban Renewal, 28 LAW & CoNrm~v. PRoB. 49 (1961). See also C. ARAms, TBE CiTY
Is Tm FRONnTER 211-53 (1965).
"1 Counting both families and individual households,
there were approximately 1,665,000 American citizens involved in the federal urban
renewal program at the end of 1962. This is approximately the same number of
people that live in Detroit, Michigan, the fifth largest city in the United States.
M. ANDERSoN, Tim FEDERAL BULLDOZER: A CRincAL ANALYsis OF URBAN RENEWAL,
1949-1962, at 54 (1964). As of year's end 1962, 1,210 urban renewal projects had re-
ceived final federal grant payments; by the end of 1968 final federal grant payments
had been made to 2,038 approved projects. Staco Mv. ON HOUSING AND URBAN
AFFAIRS, SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CuRRENCY, 91sr CONG., Isr SEW., PaoaEss
REPORT ON FEDERAL HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMs 118 (Comm. Print
1969).
12Kadish, Judicial Review in the United States Supreme Court and the High Court
of Australia, 37 TEXAs L. REv. 131, 155 (1958). Jerold H. Israel has explored the
mechanics of judicial law change in Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The "Art" of Over-
ruling, in THE Smra mE COURT AND TM CONSTITUTION 263 (P. Kurland ed. 1965). For
thoughtful, even meditative discussions of judicial law-making, see Traynor, The
Judges and Law Reform, 5 TmAL 37 (No. 3, Apr.-May 1969); Traynor, Reasoning in a
Circle of Law, 56 VA. L. REv. 739 (1970).
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tudes have occurred. Since the urban renewal story has been told in a
voluminous literature, only some of its most essential aspects need be
traced here. Many of the urgent and pressing issues raised by urban
renewal programs have not been faced by the courts. A study of the
decisions will therefore sketch in only a part of the process. The es-
sential dynamics of the rebuilding of America's cities must be sought
elsewhere-in legislation, public debate and political controversy. 3
In order to assess properly the shift in judicial position on review of
urban renewal and land use programs, some discussion of the once
relatively solid front of the courts on the controlling issues is necessary.
W\ith this perspective, it will be possible to appreciate the emerging
activism in judicial review of urban renewal14 and urban redevelopment 15
problems represented by recent decisions such as Norwalk CORE v.
Norwalk Redevelopment Agency. 6
The study closes with a description and evaluation of current litiga-
tion designed to widen the perimeters of judicial review. Most of the
suits to be discussed have not reached final disposition by appellate
tribunals and some await lower court adjudication. The very fact of
litigation is significant, however, because it represents an assessment of
the judicial temper by those who are most sensitive to shifts in court at-
titudes-the lawyers who appear before judges in the trial courts. Though
13Foard & Fefferman, Federal Urban Renewal Legislation, 25 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 635 (1960), is an excellent study of the legislative history and background of
much of the currently operative urban renewal law. For an example of recent con-
troversy over local participation in Model Cities programs, see N.Y. Times, May 22,
1969, S 1, at 1, col. 1.
14 An extensive discussion of some of the terminology of the varying efforts to renew
America's cities appears in Slayton, Conservation of Existing Housing, 20 LAw &
CoN TMp. PRoB. 436, 438 (1955). Succinct definitions of the essential terminology of
urban renewal appear in Johnstone, The Federal Urban Renewal Program, 25 U. Cm.
L. REv. 301 n.2 (1958). See S. GpiEER, supra note 5, at 20-27, for a sociologist's render-
ing of the terminology of urban renewal.
15 Redevelopnent is now generally used to denote a governmentally motivated
form of urban action, normally created by a specific state statute, aimed at the
destruction of an evil commonly referred to as "blight," followed by utilization of
the newly renovated areas by private persons who acquire ownership or leases
under restrictions and controls to ensure that "blight" will not recur.
Jacobs & Levine, Redevelopment: Making Misused and Disused Land Available and
Usable, 8 HASTINGS L.J. 241, 244 (1957). Redevelopment, at least its nascent stages,
was first given statutory expression in New York and Illinois. Urban Redevelopment
Corporations Law, N.Y. UNcONSOL. LAws § 3301-22 (McKinney 1949); The Neighbor-
hood Redevelopment Corporation Law, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, §§ 550.1-.44 (1954).
Federal assistance for redevelopment is provided by 42 U.S.C. § 1464 (Supp. IV, 1969),
and the enactments preceding its present designation.
106 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968).
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often "test case" litigation is designed to formulate issues for resolution
by appellate courts, lawyers are not uniformly insensitive to the im-
mediate needs of their clients. Presumably, the bringing of the suit
represents an informed prediction that relief will be granted, hopefully
sooner than later.'7
The recent significant shifts in judicial attitude toward review of
urban renewal agency decisions have occurred in the federal courts, and
it is federal court review that will be primarily considered in this
Article. 8 This is not to deny that state courts have played a significant
role in the legitimation of urban renewal and slum clearance schemes. 19
Far too often, however, the rights of many citizens affected by urban
renewal programs cannot be adequately protected by proceedings in
state courts.2  This is particularly true of those displaced by such
17 See ABA CANONS OF PROFEssIONAL ETHIcs No. 30:
The lawyer must decline to conduct a civil cause or to make a defense when
convinced that it is intended merely to harass or to injure the opposite party or
to work oppression or wrong. . . . His appearance in Court should be deemed
equivalent to an assertion on his honor that in his opinion his client's case is one
proper for judicial determination.
See also ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CANON 2, EC 2-30 (1969); id.
DR 2-109; id. DR 7-102 (A) (1)-(2).
18 And of course it is the federal courts that have amplified many of the relevant
administrative law problems. See L. JAFFF, supra note 1, at 461 (1965):
Most of the writing on standing, as on administrative law generally, has been
preoccupied with federal law. . . .The great, the dramatic developments have
been in the federal sphere. But we are now in a period of doctrinal consolida-
tion. Though there are obvious differences between state and federal law,
it is the resemblances which predominate.
19 That the [state] courts have played a major supporting role in the efforts to
renew our cities is witnessed by the decisions of. . . the highest courts of twenty-
nine states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico sustaining local slum
clearance and redevelopment legislation and project activities against a variety of
constitutional and procedural attacks. . . . Since the beginning of the urban
renewal program in 1949, there have been over 200 cases filed in thirty-four
jurisdictions with respect to urban renewal projects and undertakings, exclusive
of routine condemnation cases.
Osgood & Zwerner, Rehabilitation and Conservation, 25 LAw & CONTEmP. PROB. 705,
711 (1960).
20 Cf. Housing and Redevelopment Authority v. Minneapolis Metropolitan Co., 259
Minn. 1, 104 N.W.2d 864 (1960); Hunter v. City of New York, 121 N.Y.S.2d 841
(Sup. Ct. 1953). A classic-and cruel-illustration of the dilemma of litigants who
seek to challenge urban renewal activity may be seen by the one-two punch delivered
to relocatees in Illinois where both'federal and state courts closed the door to judicial
consideration of the problems of relocation. Harrison-Halsted Community Group v.
HHFA, 310 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 914 (1963). See text fol-
lowing note 103 infra; City of Chicago v. R. Zwick Co, 27 Ill. 2d 128, 188 N.E.2d
489, appeal dismissed sub nom. Gonzales v. City of Chicago, 373 U.S. 542 (1963).
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projects. State court relief, expressed most frequently in eminent domain
condemnation proceedings, is often inadequate and usually too late.21
Moreover, neighborhoods marked for clearance usually begin to de-
teriorate as soon as schemes to redevelop them are made public. Land-
lords cease to repair, municipal services decline and residents begin to
flee, often leaving the housing stock in disrepair and sometimes aban-
doned. Federal court review prior to condemnation proceedings is nec-
essary if many of the disputes emerging from urban land use plans are
21 A recent study indicates that
[p]resent levels of relocation assistance are inadequate to compensate the losses
suffered and individuals forced to leave their homes by government land acquisi-
tion and code enforcement campaigns .... By the time the number of displace-
ments resulting from condemnation had become significant [ie., prior to massive
government financed urban renewal programs], the concept of "just com-
pensation" had already crystallized into substantially its present form: the market
value of the property taken. Incidental losses are generally ignored in con-
demnation awards, at least in theory, unless they are directly associated with
real property.
Note, The Interest in Rootedness: Family Relocation and an Approach to Full In-
demnity, 21 STAN. L. REv. 801, 803 (1969). Although many groups have suffered, the
impact on small businesses has been devastating. Brown University sociologist Basil G.
Zimmer has written of the personal disasters suffered by small businessmen in Zimmer,
The Small Businessman and Relocation, in URBAx RxNawAL: Tim REcoaD AND nm
CorRovaasy 380, 401 (J. Wilson ed. 1966):
The programs for rebuilding cities are effectively eliminating the small marginal
businesses. For such units, relocation is frequently not feasible. These businesses
tend to be owned by older persons and those with very limited financial re-
sources. Displacement in such cases has the effect of depriving the owners of
their usual livelihood, meager as it may have been prior to the disruption. For
the most part, the owner received no compensation for his loss, even though he
had been forced to vacate his site. In some instances where they happened to
own the building that they occupied, some minor adjustments may have been
made in the price paid for the property which would make the loss less severe.
But no such even token adjustments were possible in the case of renters.
See also Ayer, Allocating the Costs of Determining "Just Compensation," 21 STAN.
L. Rxv. 693, 703-06 (1969); Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on
the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165, 1245-58
(1967); Sengstock & McAuliffe, What is the Price of Eminent Domain? An Introduction
to the Problems of Valuation in Eminent Domain Proceedings, 44 J. UmAN L. 185
(1966). For a comprehensive compilation of the authorities, see Mandelker, Housing
Codes, Building Demolition and just Compensation, 67 Mica. L. Ray. 635, 655 nn.92-94
(1969).
Ironically, "absence of a written constitution allows the English system greater flexi-
bility in deciding when to compensate. Parliament makes the sole and final policy
judgment as to what is fair. If it provides for compensation, then there is com-
pensation; if not, then there is none.... [T]he courts fix awards at amounts that will
compensate not only for loss of the land itself, but also for disruption of business,
loss of good will, and removal expenses. The aim is full compensation for the
whole change in the landowner's position before and after the taking." LAw AND LAND
277 (C. Haar ed. 1964).
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to be resolved satisfactorily and not mooted.22 An appreciation of the
struggle therefore primarily requires an appreciation of the evolution of
review of urban renewal legislation by federal judges.
JUDICIAL LEGITIMATION OF URBAN RENEWAL
I am not aware of any limitations in the Constitution of the United
States upon a State's power to condemn land within its borders, except
the requirements as to compensation.23
The Mood of Acquiescence
Limited judicial review of legislation designed to remedy urban
housing ills is in large part the heritage of a traditional deference by the
courts to the judgment of the people's elected representatives in the de-
termination of land to be taken for public use. As Justice Frankfurter
observed in his concurrence in United States ex rel. TVA v. Welch,2
the Supreme Court
never deviated from the view that under the Constitution a claim that
a taking is not "for public use" is open for judicial consideration, ul-
timately by this Court. It is equally true that in the numerous cases
in which the issue was adjudicated, this" Court never found that the
legislative determination that the use was "public" exceeded Consti-
tutional bounds. 25
Thus, the Supreme Court's decision in Berman v. Parke20 in 1954 was
but the culmination of more than a half century of judicial laissez faire-
22If federal court review is to exist, it must be available at an early stage before
these conditions begin to materialize. It may be argued that this is the only time at
which many of the legal issues are open to judicial scrutiny. After the displacement
has been effected by the commencement of the scheme, the litigants' efforts to enjoin
the project are largely mooted since the primary damage sought to be prevented has
become an irrevocable fact.2 3 Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239, 260 (1905)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
2327 U.S. 546 (1946).
2 Id. at 557. The majority opinion was susceptible to a broader reading than that of
Mr. Justice Frankfurter. See notes 35-39 infra and accompanying text.
26348 U.S. 26 (1954). Some commentators thought the public use doctrine was deai
before Berman. Cf. Note, The Public Use Limiiation on Eminent Domain, 58 YALE L.J.
599, 613-14 (1949), which commented on Welch:
The Supreme Court has repudiated the doctrine of public use. Most state
courts have arrived at the same conclusion, although rarely with so much direct-
ness. Doubtless the doctrine will continue to be evoked nostalgically in dicta and
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ism in eminent domain.27 It was the archetypical case of taking from A
in order to give to B. Pursuant to statute28 the District of Columbia
Redevelopment Land Agency sought to obtain nonslum property which
was used as a department store. After acquisition, the property was
subject to sale to another private party for use in accordance with an
area-wide plan promulgated by the Planning Commission. Giving the
statute the broadest possible scope,29 Justice Douglas, speaking for a
unanimous court, suggested that the landowner sought to substitute his
standard of the public need for the standard prescribed by Congress.
If owner after owner were permitted to resist these redevelopment
programs on the ground that his particular property was not being
used against the public interest, integrated plans for redevelopment
would suffer greatly.... It is not for the courts to oversee the choice
of the boundary line nor to sit in review on the size of a particular
project area. Once the question of the public purpose has been de-
cided, the amount and character of land to be taken for the project
and the need for a particular tract to complete the integrated plan
rests in the discretion of the legislative branch. 0
"Once the question of the public purpose has been decided" was a
fateful phrase. Read against the backdrop of Welch, which the court
cited twice in the nine-page opinion, the language of Berman, if not
may even be employed authoritatively in rare, atypical situations. Kinder hands,
however, would accord it the permanent interment in the digests that is so long
overdue.
27 For a collection of some of the state court decisions upholding urban renewal laws,
see In re Opinion of the Justices, 332 Mass. 769, 126 N.E.2d 795 (1955); Osgood &
Zwerner, supra note 19, at 711-12 (1960); 1955 ILL. L.F. 145 n.6.28 District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945, ch. 736, 60 Star. 790 (1946).
29 The Court expressly disavowed a much narrower construction by Judge Prettyman,
who wrote the opinion for a three-judge court in Schneider v. District of Columbia,
117 F. Supp. 705 (D.D.C. 1953), upholding the same legislation:
The District Court below suggested that, if such a broad scope were intended
for the statute, the standards contained in the Act would not be sufficiently
definite to sustain the delegation of authority .... We do not agree. We think
the standards prescribed were adequate for executing the plan to eliminate not
only slums as narrowly defined by the District Court hut also the blighted areas
that tend to produce slums.
348 U.S. at 35. In Schneider, the case to which Justice Douglas had referred, Judge
Prettyman said that the Government's claim was
that if slums exist the Government may seize, redevelop and sell all the prop-
erty in any area it may select as appropriate, so long as the area includes the
slum area. This amounts to a claim on the part of the authorities for unreviewable
power to seize and sell whole sections of the city.
117 F. Supp. at 721.
30 348 U.S. at 35-36.
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the facts upon which it was based,31 extremely narrowed the role of
the judiciary while expanding to the outermost limits the power of the
legislature to define public purpose.
We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project is
or is not desirable. The concept of the public welfare is broad and
inclusive.... The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical,
aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature
to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy,
spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.
In the present case, the Congress and its authorized agencies have made
determinations that take into account a wide variety of values. It is
not for us to reappraise them. If those who govern the District of
Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as well
as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the
way.
Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to
realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is clear.
32
In declaring "the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian
of the public needs to be served by social legislation" 33 and affirming
the right of Congress to pursue definitions of public use under the aegis
of police power, Justice Douglas all but removed the judiciary from the
urban renewal equation. 4
31The record and opinion of the lower court, 117 F. Supp. 705, make it clear that
the renewal scheme was not unreasonable because the selected area was blighted by any
standard.
Surveys revealed that.. . 64.3% of the dwellings were beyond repair, 18.4%
needed major repairs, only 17.3% were satisfactory; 57.8% of the dwellings had
outside toilets, 60.3% had no baths, 29.3% lacked electricity, 82.2% had no wash
basins or laundry tubs, 83.8% lacked central heating.
348 U.S. at 30. In the same area death rates from tuberculosis per 100,000 population
amounted to 83.7 persons as opposed to 35.5 for the entire District of Columbia, and
deaths from syphillis 41.8 per 100,000 as opposed to only 7.1 for the entire District of
Columbia. 117 F. Supp. at 709.
32 348 U.S. at 33.
a3 ldrat 32.
341955 I-L.. LF. 145, and 40 IowA L. Rv. 659 (1955), disapproved of the decision.
Contra, 53 Micn. L. REv. 883 (1955), viewing the case as a retreat from Welch:
[Berman] reasserts the intention of the Court to determine for itself whether a
condemnation is for a public purpose, but the Court indicates that its role here
is an extremely limited one.... Thus it is clear that the requirement of public
use no longer exists and the only limits upon the federal government's power of
eminent domain are the requirements that just compensation be paid and that
the object falls within one of the enumerated powers.
Id. at 884.
Jacob M. Lashly, American Bar Association President for 1940-41, noted:
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Though Berman might be viewed as the last brick in a wall of separa-
tion between the courts and the urban renewal programs, in some
respects it did not go so far as Welch, where the Court approved TVA's
taking of land in an isolated area to add to a national park. The action
was designed solely to save local, state and federal authorities the cost of
constructing a costly highway to reach families cut off when a TVA-
constructed power dam flooded the only road servicing the disputed
area. Justice Black, writing for the Court, declared, "it is the function
of Congress to decide what type of taking is for public use and that the
agency authorized to do the taking may do so to the full extent of its
statutory authority." 85 Citing with approval language from an earlier
case where the Court had said that legislative determination of public
use "is entitled to deference until it is shown to involve an impossi-
bility," 36 Justice Black said that any other course "would result in courts
deciding on what is and is not a governmental function and in their
invalidating legislation on the basis of their view on that question." 37
Perceiving the implications of the Court's rationale, Justice Reed con-
curred in the result but refused to join in the opinion
The decision and opinion passed over quietly, like the Fourth of July in a
foreign country. Yet, it informed the country that we have come to the end
of something, to the end of much that we have been accustomed to regard as
precious and to suppose that we would never relinquish....
Whraat measures are for the public good and what are public uses and purposes
in the first instance are matters for legislative determination. The legislative
decision of those agencies, when acting within their constitutional and statutory
powers, are conclusive upon property owners. Courts are to determine questions
of power, not policy. The decision seems to introduce a new era in democracy.
Community symmetry and benefits are to be substituted for individual prefer-
ences, and the privileges of property ownership and the rights of property uses
are to be directed and, in a larger measure than previously, controlled by public
authority. The decision is of great political significance as well as legal conse-
quence.
Lashly, The Case of Berman v. Parker, 41 A.BA.J. 501, 503 (1955).
Mr. Lashly's lachrymose prose echoed Judge Prettyman's nostalgia about the
poor . . . entitled to own what they can afford. The slow, the old, the small in
ambition, the devotee of the outmoded have no less right to property than have
the quick, the young, the aggressive, and the modernistic or futuristic.
117 F. Supp. at 719.
Other students of eminent domain viewed the decision in Berman more
favorably. Allison Dunham applauded Justice Douglas' equating public use with
public purpose, which removed "a real limitation on governmental power.' Dunham,
Property, City Planning and Liberty, in LAW AND LAND 28, 37 (C. Haar ed. 1964).
In Dunham's view, Berman liberated planning so that its decisions could be subjected "to
the tests of the market place." Id. at 35-36.
35 327 U.S. at 551-52.
86 Old Dominion Land Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55,66 (1925).
37 327 U.S. at 552.
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because of certain language which implies... that there is no judicial
review of the Authority's determinations that acquisition of these
isolated pieces of private property is within the purposes of the TVA
Act ...
This taking is for a public purpose but whether it is or is not is a
judicial question. Of course, the legislative or administrative determina-
tion has great weight but the constitutional doctrine of the Separation
of Powers would be unduly restricted if an administrative agency could
involve a so-called political power so as to immunize its action against
judicial examination in contests between the agency and the citizen. 38
Furthermore, Justice Frankfurter, while endorsing the opinion of the
Court, felt compelled to write a separate concurrence to emphasize "the
fact that the nature of the subject matter gives the legislative determina-
tion nearly immunity from judicial review does not mean that the power
to review is wanting." 11
In tandem, Berman and Welch represent the nadir of activism in
judicial review of land acquisition through eminent domain.4 Together
they are representative of a judicial attitude of restraint which was to
characterize subsequent review of urban renewal programs.
The Gordian Knot of Standing to Sue
For fifteen years following Berman the bleak lesson of federal
court judicial review of urban renewal program activity was that
city hall was invincible. 41 In lawsuits where powerful economic
and political interests were arrayed on the side of government in the
name of progress, the outcome was with monotonous regularity favor-
able to urban renewal agencies. Litigants who attacked the planning
process in federal courts prior to state eminent domain proceedings were
often directed by the judges merely to await their day in court.42 How-
38 ld. at 556-57.
39 Id. at 557.
40 "[Berman] appears to foreclose any substantial federal judicial control of re-
newal programs through the public use requirement." Note, Public Use as a
Limitation on Eminent Domain in Urban Renewal, 68 HAtv. L. RFv. 1422, 1426 (1955).41Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency (Norwalk 1), 395 F.2d 920
(2d Cir. 1968), discussed at text following note 142 infra, marked the end of this period.
42 E.g., Green Street Ass'n v. Daley, 373 F.2d 1, 6 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S.
932 (1967):
[Tin nearly all cases the question of whether land to be acquired will be devoted
to a public purpose is more appropriate for the state court to make in condemna-
tion proceedings.
Cf. Baber v. Texas Util. Co., 228 F.2d 665 (5th Cir. 1956).
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ever, the day in state court condemnation proceedings was (and still is)
usually a "dark" one, for eminent domain only involves the adequacy
of compensation, not the propriety of the taking in the first instance.
Courts grope rather ineffectually at determining how "just" compensa-
tion may be expressed in dollars and cents. They rarely, if ever, over-
turn the condemnor's decision to condemn.43
Since the propriety of the taking-and the often attendant catastrophic
effects-is a state court responsibility, federal judges often demur to the
task of reconciling the sovereign power with Hobhouse's insistence that
a rational social order does not rest "the essential indispensible condition
of the happiness of one man on the unavoidable misery of another, the
happiness of forty millions of men on the misery of one." 44 In cases
after Berman, standing to sue was the rubric under which federal courts
escaped the urgent questions presented by litigants seeking refuge from
the urban renewal juggernaut.
Standing has been a special and largely self-imposed cross of the
federal courts.45 Though Congress has dealt generally with the question
43 See Comment, Abusive Exercises of the Power of Eminent Domain-Taking a Look
at Wbat the Taker Took, 44 WASH. L. REv. 200, 207, 212-13 (1968):
The courts have retained complete and independent control over matters of
compensation and the observance of statutory and due process requirements....
More important, courts have tended to defer to legislative declarations, express
or implied, of what uses are "public uses."
[Tihe requirement that the owner of appropriated property be compensated for
the taking does add an effective limitation-perhaps the only real limitation-on
the exercise of the power of eminent domain .... To the extent that he has or
can borrow the money to pay for the property he wants, the requirement of com-
pensation does not limit his exercise of the power. And even with compensation,
the property owner is not fully protected. Aside from the fact that one can
never fully compensate an owner for intangible losses resulting from the taking
of his property, even economic [losses] . . . have been held noncompensable
injuries incident to a taking.
44 L. HOBHOTSsE: LiBERALISm 41 (1964), quoted in Michelman, supra note 6, at 1166.45 The constitutional requirement of a case or controversy, U.S. CoNsr. art. III,
2, as a prerequisite of federal court jurisdiction does not specify standing and justici-
ability as the two tests which must be met before a court can act. The doctrine of
standing has been developed by the courts as an adjunct to determining whether a
case or controversy exists over which they can properly assume jurisdiction. Flast
v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-101 (1968). The result of this analytical tool has been a
rigidification of the criteria of standing as ends which themselves must be met, regard-
less of whether a case or controversy might otherwise exist. While Flast suggests a
return to examining the purposes for which the doctrine of standing was originally
designed to serve in order to determine whether the court can take the jurisdiction
of the case, id. at 99-101, it is doubtful that a body of case law so long established
will erode overnight. The result will presumably continue to be that
[olne who is seriously harmed by reviewable administrative action which is
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of standing in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),46 it has not
specifically provided for judicial review of action by the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) .7 Since there is no "person
illegal or even unconstitutional is often denied judicial review on account of
lack of standing. The law of standing is fundamentally artificial to the extent
that one who is in fact harmed by administrative action is held to lack standing
to challenge the legality of the action. The artificiality-frequently running
counter to natural instincts of judges-results in a complexity that is so great
that the Supreme Court often violates the principles that the Court has laid
down for its own guidance.
3 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRAiVE LAW § 22.01, at 210 (1958). Professor Davis notes that
[iun contrast with the federal courts, many state courts recognize the standing
of citizens, of residents, and of persons described as "citizens and taxpayers" to
challenge administrative action. Standing of taxpayers is very common ....
Id. S 22.10, at 249.
40 The APA provides that a "person suffering legal wrong because of agency action,
or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. I1, 1968). While
the Supreme Court has never decided the question, lower courts have consistently held
that the APA does not expand the law of standing and that a person must have suffered
a legal wrong or be able to point to a statute that specifically authorizes judicial review
before he can rely on this section of the APA to support his claim for standing. E.g.,
Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 884 (1955). While Professor Jaffe endorses this position, L. JA1FE, supra note 1,
at 528-31, Professor Davis, an advocate of a liberal and expansive law of standing,
has argued that the older concepts of standing were broadened by Congress to include
persons "adversely affected in fact?' 3 X. DAvis, supra note 45, § 22.02, at 212.
47 See Note, Family Relocation in Urban Renewal, supra note 4, at 890-94; Note,
Judicial Review of Displacee Relocation in Urban Renewal, 77 YAmE L.J. 966 (1968);
Note, Protecting the Standing of Renewal Site Families to Seek Review of Community
Relocation Planning, 73 YALE L.J. 1080 (1964). The only administrative remedy available
to objectors who are not parties to the contract between the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) and the local public agency (LPA, the agency usually
executing the urban renewal plan), is to protest at a public hearing provided by statute
and HUD regulation. 42 U.S.C. § 1455(d) (Supp. IV, 1969); HUD URBAN RENEwAL
HAN oor, RHA 7212.1, ch. 1, at 3. The meeting considers the entire redevelopment
plan and hardly lends itself to the interposition of personal or individualized objec-
tions. However, enterprising lawyers of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, Inc. (and its newly funded division, the National Office for the Rights of
Indigents) devised and filed complaints with HUD concerning projects in Pulaski,
Tennessee, and Newark, New Jersey. Both complaints led to successful adjustment of
community grievances about project plans. In the Pulaski controversy, the Renewal
Assistance Administration of HUD rejected the final stage of the city's renewal plan
partly because of the LPA's inability to provide adequate relocation facilities. In
Newark, the complaint led to a massive reduction in the amount of land to be taken
for the site of a medical college and the establishment of five committees, each with
a majority of site residents to insure proper relocation, increased employment and
better health services. See Tondro, Urban Renewal Relocation: Problems in Enforcement
of Conditions on Federal Grants to Local Agencies, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 183, 202-04
(1968).
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aggrieved" statute upon which the disputants of HUD activity can
premise their standing,48 they must seek to convince the court that they
have been subjected to a legal wrong49 or are implied beneficiaries of a
statute.5
0
In Gart v. Cole5" the court was faced with efforts of landowners and
48See FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940), which held that
5 402(b) of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (6) (1964), supported
the right of a licensee of a broadcasting station to challenge an FCC permit to a rival
station. The statute specifically provided for judicial review. The question was whether
the licensee was a "person aggrieved or whose interests are adversely affected." Id. Prior
cases had generally restricted the class of "persons aggrieved" to those showing a likeli-
hood of economic injury. E.g., Southwestern Publishing Co. v. FCC, 243 F.2d 829 (D.C.
Cir. 1957); NBC v. FCC, 132 F.2d 545 (D.C. Cir. 1942), aff'd, 319 U.S. 239 (1943).
However, United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966), noted in 52
VA. L. REv. 1360 (1966), apparently expanded "person aggrieved" to include a mem-
ber of the licensee's audience. See 65 MIcH. L. REv. 518 (1967).
On occasion, standing will obtain as a result of state or local legislative provision as
in Blachman v. Erieview Corp., 311 F.2d 85 (6th Cir. 1962), where plaintiff sued as a
taxpayer pursuant to a specific provision in the city charter granting the right to
institute proceedings to restrain performance of illegal contracts.
49 Infringement by an agency or official of a right guaranteed by the Constitution, a
statute, or the common law has generally been held a sufficient basis for standing under
the "legal right theory." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (alleged violation of
establishment of religion clause of the first amendment); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 US. 123 (1951) (common law libel, by implication, held to
support suit against agency for labeling it subversive); Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co,
310 U.S. 113 (1940) (violation of statutory right, by implication).
The legal right theory of standing has been explained by Judge Frank:
In a suit in a federal court by a citizen against a government officer, com-
plaining of alleged past or threatened future unlawful conduct by the defendant,
there is no justiciable "controversy," without which, under Article III, § 2 of the
Constitution, the court has no jurisdiction, unless the citizen shows that such
conduct or threatened conduct invaded or will invade a private substantive
legally protected interest of the plaintiff citizen; such invaded interest must be
either of a "recognized" character, at "common law" or a substantive private
legally protected interest created by statute. In other words, unless the citizen
first shows that, if the defendant were a private person having no official status,
the particular defendant's conduct or threatened conduct would give rise to a
cause of action against him by that particular citizen, the court cannot consider
whether the defendant officer's conduct is or is not authorized by statute ...
Unless, then, the citizen first shows that some substantive private legally protected
interest possessed by him has been invaded or is threatened with invasion by
the defendant officer thus regarded as a private person, the suit must fail.
Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 700 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707
(1943).
50 Findings of implied statutory protection against competition have been held a suf-
ficient basis for the determination of standing. Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390
U.S. 1 (1968), stating a concept first developed in The Chicago Junction Case, 264
U.S. 258 (1924).
5" 166 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), aft'd, 263 F.2d 244 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 978 (1959).
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tenants to block New York City's Lincoln Square urban renewal proj-
ect.52 A range of objections was raised against the project, among them
that it violated the mandate of the first amendment for separation of
church and state because Fordham University, a Catholic institution,
sponsored the plan. Plaintiffs also claimed that the city's negotiation of
minimum bids to be made by the sponsors at a subsequent public auc-
tion was unlawful and that the federal administrator of the Federal
Housing and Home Finance Authority (HHFA is now HUD)"5 il-
legally denied tenants an oral hearing at which to challenge the feasi-
bility of the city's relocation plan.
The court ruled that the plaintiffs did not have standing to sue under
the APA.54 It found they were not "suffering legal wrong because of
any agency action" since the expenditure of funds for the project was
not illegal. The only possible illegality in the scheme was the condem-
nation proceedings, and the court ruled that this issue must be decided
by the state courts in eminent domain hearings. 5 It furthermore held
that the plaintiffs were not "aggrieved... within the meaning of any
relevant statute" since no statute provided specifically for judicial review
nor did any legislative history imply that Congress contemplated such
action.56 The home owners and tenants were therefore denied the
chance to litigate the merits of their case.
Although Lincoln Center now stands as a monument to the perform-
ing arts, to coordinated city planning, 7 and to the failure of area resi-
dents to bring the project to a halt, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
did take a more sophisticated view of the narrow issue of standing.
While the court agreed with the district court's construction of the
APA, it held, without offering an explicit rationale, that there was stand-
52 The case was the fifth of a protracted series of lawsuits seeking to halt the project,
which included the famous Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts and its Metropolitan
Opera House. See 64th Street Residences, Inc. v. City of New York, 4 N.Y.2d 268, 150
N.E.2d 396, 174 N.Y.S.2d 1, cert. denied, 357 U.S. 907 (1958).
53 42 U.S.C. § 3532 (a) (Supp. IV, 1969).
54 166 F. Supp. at 134-35.
53 Id. at 134.
56 d. at 135-36.
5 7 There has been dissent about "decontaminated islands of monuments." See
J. JAcoBS, THE DEATH AND LiuE OF GREAT AMEiCAN CITIEs 167-70 (Vintage ed. 1961).
She argues that primary uses, such as Carnegie Hall and the Metropolitan Opera House,
are better spread throughout the city as "generators of diversity."
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ing to challenge the refusal of HHFA to grant an oral hearing at which
opponents could challenge the feasibility of relocation.58
It may be possible to construct by inference the court's theory of
standing. In dealing with the allegation that the bidding arrangements
violated the Housing Act of 1949, the court said that the bidding pro-
cedures were designed to protect the public at large, not the site
residents, and cited Massachusetts v. Mellon. 9 Immediately thereafter
the court found there was standing to challenge the relocation plan. It
therefore appears certain that while there was no standing as taxpayers
to protect the general public, there was standing to protect individual
rights as relocatees6 ° Although the basis of standing found was ex-
tremely narrow, Gart represented a rare recognition of the right to
seek review of urban renewal activity in the federal courts. Ironically,
subsequent cases limited the meager advance made in Gart, often citing
that case as support for denying standing on general grounds.61
In a few urban renewal cases, courts have found standing presumably
because the grievances were sharply defined-they could be reduced
to some readily quantifiable concept-or were expressed in terms readily
understandable by courts conditioned to protecting wealth and economic
5S 263 F.2d 244, 250 (2d Cir. 1959). Despite the holding, the court refused to order
such a hearing because there had been a previous public hearing and the Renewal
Assistance Administration had granted an opportunity to submit documentary informa-
tion on the issue of relocation. Id. at 250-51.
5 262 U.S. 447 (1923). The case was companion to the landmark Frothingham v.
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), where the Court rejected a suit by a taxpayer to deter-
mine the constitutionality of a federal statute providing grants to the states. Frothing-
ham rested, of course, on lack of standing. In Alassachmsetts, the Court said the issue
was political and therefore not justiciable. The force of both decisions has been di-
minished by Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
40The plaintiffs in Gart based standing on various provisions of the Housing Act
of 1949 as well as the APA. The court said that the section prohibiting the Adminis-
trator from delegating the responsibility for reviewing findings by the LPA's of
relocation feasibility, Housing Act of 1954, ch. 649, § 101(c), 68 Star. 623, formerly
42 U.S.C. § 1451 (c)(iv), (repealed, Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment Act, Pub. L. No. 89-174, § 7, 79 Star. 670 (1965)), "is in protection of the in-
terests of displaced residents such as appellants, [who] have standing" to raise the
claim that the Administrator illegally delegated his duty. 263 F.2d at 251. The court,
however, found summary judgment properly entered because of a lack of proof of
misconduct.
61 E.g., Harrison-Halsted Community Group, Inc. v. HHFA, 310 F.2d 99, 104-05
(7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 914 (1963); Pittsburgh Hotels Ass'n v. Urban Re-
development Authority, 309 F.2d 186, 189 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 916
(1963).
19701
842 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 56:826
interests. Whatever the reason, it is clear that efforts to halt perman-
ently an urban renewal project are almost invariably doomed to failure.
On the other hand, as this Article will subsequently show, if some very
narrow relief is sought that will not involve the court in confronting
the political and economic decisions that led to formulating the project
nor involve its consequent "disruption," 62 there is the possibility of get-
ting beyond dismissal for lack of standing, and indeed, even beyond
summary judgment.
Merge v. Sharott63 illustrates judicial response to well-defined and
narrowed prayers for relief. There, owners of the Asphalt Products
Company brought suit in the District Court for the Western District
of Pennsylvania against the Coordinator of the Urban Renewal Ad-
ministration, the Administrator of the HHFA and the Urban Redevelop-
ment Authority of Pittsburgh for declaratory judgment in an effort to
recover $30,500, the balance of the reasonable and necessary cost of
moving their business. Pittsburgh's Chateau Street West Project included
one-half of the land upon which the company operated as a unified
business from two leased buildings located on opposite sides of the
street. The Urban Renewal Authority paid the plaintiffs $42,339.37,
the cost of moving that part of the business which was operated from
the building located in the project area, but adamantly refused to pay
the cost of moving the remainder of the business housed across the
street although there was absolutely no question that the two locations
were operated as one indivisible unit.
The trial judge, apparently given to understatement, said he thought
"whoever is in charge ... should have paid [the total expenses of re-
location of the business] as an administrative matter. It seems to me
just and fair that they should have paid it." 64 However, he accepted
the defendants' argument that relocation payments are not a matter of
right but of congressional grace,65 and held that the owners of the busi-
ness suffered no legal wrong that would entitle them to review under
the APA.
The court of appeals disagreed, finding that the plaintiffs were "per-
sons suffering legal wrong because of ... agency action," were "ad-
versely affected or aggrieved by such action," and were therefore
6 See generally Klein, Eminent Domain: Judicial Response to the Human Disruption,
46 J. URBAN L. 1 (1968).
-63 341 F.2d 989 (3d Cir. 1965).
6d. at 991 (quoting unreported district court opinion).
05 Id. See note 21 supra, especially the last paragraph.
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"entitled to review under the Administrative Procedure Act." 66 Rather
than attributing the relocation provisions of the Housing Act to Con-
gressional largess, the court held they constituted a
binding obligation upon the United States . . . incurred pursuant to
Congressional authority and design, as Congress from the first had
evidenced a real and recurring concern for persons displaced as a
result of the program, ultimately providing for compensation to mii-
gate their hardship.67
Conceding that the amount of the relocation payment was within the
discretion of the Housing and Home Finance Agency, the court held
that
at the very least there is a substantial question... whether the Agency
refusal to pay plaintiffs the balance of their moving costs is not
arbitrary, capricious and actually contrary to the language of the
statute and the HHFA regulations.68
Finding that there was no way in which the company could proceed
in the state courts under state law (since Pennsylvania did not authorize
the payment of relocation expenses as part of its eminent domain pro-
ceedings), the court held that plaintiffs could sue in the district court
on their claim against the HHFA for the balance of their moving
expenses. 69
Merge represents the ideal situation from a plaintiff's point of view.
The claim was liquidated. No alternative remedy existed. The Govern-
ment's position was untenable, even outrageous. The intent of Congress
was clearly to provide a compensatory subsidy"0 for businesses that were
"urban renewed." 71 The company was not attempting to represent
66 341 F.2d at 991. The court in this case also failed to define the precise theory of
standing which it recognized. After noting plaintiff's theories of standing under the
APA, it stated only that it saw "no real difficulty in plaintiffs continuing as they are
under the Administrative Procedure Act." Id. at 995. Perhaps it is significant that the
court thereafter noted that such "course has not been challenged by the defense." Id.
107 Id. at 993 (footnote omitted).
68 Id. at 995.
69Id.
70 Cf. Aycock-Lindsey Corp. v. United States, 171 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1948).
71 The relocation payments were specifically provided for by 42 U.S.C. § 1456(f)
(1958), which was repealed by Pub. L. No. 88-560, § 310(c), 78 Stat. 790 (1964); they
are now authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 1465 (b) (Supp. IV, 1969).
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the general public or even a general class of relocated businesses. Also,
in many ways the plaintiffs' claim was likely to be rare, for businesses
situated as was plaintiffs' were bound to be few. Most important, pay-
ment of the claim would in no way disrupt development of the project.
. Where protection of an asserted economic interest has required the
court to judge the propriety and reasonableness of the decision to under-
take the urban renewal project, standing has generally been found
wanting. In the same year the Third Circuit found standing in Merge,
the Second Circuit in Berry v. HHFA72 tersely disposed of an attempt
by owners of a hotel to enjoin an entire nearby urban renewal project
because it was to include transient housing units which would compete
for guests that might otherwise have patronized plaintiffs' business. In
a two-paragraph per curiam opinion the court denied standing to the
hotel owners as taxpayers and as persons who sustained economic loss
through competition, despite plaintiffs' contention that they were en-
titled to sue by virtue of a 1959 amendment to the Housing Acte8 which
required a survey of the need for new hotels or transient facilities. The
hotel owners had sought standing under 42 U.S.C. § 1456(g) partly to
escape Taft Hotel Corp. v. HHFA,74 which, relying on Alabama Power
Co. v. Ickes7' 5 and Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co.,7 held "[e]conomic loss
stemming from lawful competition, even though made possible by fed-
eral aid, is damnum absque injuria." 77 The court, however, viewed the
amendment as a device to protect the predominantly residential nature
of projects and said the Housing Agency could vindicate the public
interest by withholding funds if the provision was violated. Private
hotel owners had no remedy, said the court.
72 340 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1965) (per curiam).
73 42 U.S.C. § 1456 (g) (Supp. IV, 1969).
74 262 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 967 (1959).
75 302 U.S. 464 (1938).
76 310 U.S. 113 (1940). Perkins was later legislatively overruled, 41 U.S.C. § 43a (1964),
and according to Professor Davis "is difficult or impossible to reconcile with other
Supreme Court decisions." 3 K. DAvis, supra note 45, § 22.04, at 220. Perkins had held
companies could not complain of and were bound by wage determinations made in
administrative proceedings in which they did not participate. The statute under which
the wage rates were made was not for the benefit of those who sold to the Government,
the Court said, and the Government enjoyed "unrestricted power" to fix the terms upon
which it would do business. Therefore, reasoned the Court, if the steel companies
wanted, to do business with the Government, they had to abide by the wage determina-
tions even if they were founded upon erroneous statutory determinations, since no right
of the companies had been violated.
7262 F.2d at 308.
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There are instances where an individual has no legal remedy even
though a federal law affecting his interests may have been violated.
Some statutes create public rights, enforceable only by the agency
charged with their administration. 78
The holding was consistent with other decisions in which courts have
had to choose between a citizen and an urban renewal project. Unable
to frame the relief sought in terms that would not sabotage the project,
the plaintiffs shared the fate accorded other litigants who had sought
to stop urban renewal to avoid competition.79
Displacee Relocation: Hard Cases and Human Suffering
The Housing Act of 1949 declared as its paramount objective "the
realization as soon as feasible of the goal of a decent home and a suitable
living environment for every American family .... ." 1o The commit-
ment was reaffirmed in the Housing and Urban Development Act of
1968 where Congress conceded that the "goal has not been fully realized
for many of the Nation's lower income families; that this is a matter of
grave national concern . . . ." 81 As to relocation, the original require-
ments of the Housing Act of 1949 for "decent, safe, and sanitary" 82
rehousing for displaced families were successively strengthened by
Congresss3 in reaction to outrages visited upon poor (usually black)84
families uprooted and dispersed by urban renewal projects.
78 340 F.2d at 940.
79 The public good sought through the Housing Act could well be frustrated by
delay and expense of litigation if allowed on the suit of every person objecting
to possible competition in renewal projects.
Id.; see Pittsburgh Hotels Ass'n v. Urban Redevelopment Authority, 309 F.2d 186
(3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 916 (1963) (hotel association and owners had no
standing to enjoin construction of hotels by private parties to be built on urban
renewal land which would compete with plaintiffs); Allied-City Wide, Inc. v. Cole,
230 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (lessees of business premises had no standing to contest
agreements between New York City and the HHFA which they said would result
in their eviction without compensation).
80 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (Supp. IV, 1969).
81 12 U.S.C. § 1701t (Supp. IV, 1969).
8242 U.S.C. § 1455(c) (1) (Supp. IV, 1969).
83See Merge v. Sharott, 341 F.2d 989, 993 n.6 (3d Cir. 1965); Note, Family Reloca-
tion in Urban Renewal, supra note 4, at 87o.
84 Although Negroes occupy only about one-fourth of the substandard dwelling
units in the nation, nearly 70 per cent of the dwelling units condemned for
urban renewal projects have been Negro residences. This is largely due to their
central location and deteriorated conditions, but the effects are the same as they
would be if dehousing Negroes were the goal. There is little indication that
urban renewal has had any intention or effect of increasing the housing open to
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The dismal story of urban renewal's relocation tragedy has been told
repeatedly in excruciating detail85 and need not be recounted here except
as a stark backdrop to nearly a decade of judicial apathy and diffidence
in the face of a social problem of the highest magnitude. As the Kerner
Commission pointed out:
Today, after more than three decades of fragmented and grossly
under-funded Federal housing programs, decent housing remains a
chronic problem for the disadvantaged urban household. Fifty-six
percent of the country's nonwhite families live in central cities today,
and of these, nearly two-thirds live in neighborhoods marked by sub-
standard housing and general urban blight. For these citizens, con-
demned by segregation and poverty to live in the decaying slums of
our central cities, the goal of a decent home and suitable environment
is as far distant as ever.
To date, Federal building programs have been able to do compara-
tively little to provide housing for the disadvantaged. In the 31-year
history of subsidized Federal housing, only about 800,000 units have
been constructed, with recent production averaging about 50,000 units
a year. By comparison, over a period only 3 years longer, FHA in-
surance guarantees have made possible the construction of over 10
million middle and upper-income units.86
Yet, while urban renewal was displacing six families for each low-rent
unit constructed, 7 and while "families in New York City scurr[ied]
Negro occupancy, with the exception of public housing and a few relocation
housing projects. Most of the 97 per cent of housing in the "standing stock"
remains closed to Negroes, while a portion of that which is available to them is
being destroyed.
S. GREmR, supra note 5, at 151. See P. Rossi & R. D TarLER, ThE PoLITcs oF URBAN RE-
NzwAL (1961); Note, Judicial Review of Displacee Relocation in Urban Renewal, 77
YAI L.J. 966, 967 n.7 (1968), which lists some of the literature of "Negro removal"
85 See, e.g., C. ABRAMs, Tm Crry Is Thm FRONIER ch. 8 (1965); HousE Commus. oN
Punuc WoRKs, 88TH CONG., 2D SEss., STuDY or COMPENSATION AND AssIsrANcE FoR
PRSONS AFFECTED BY REAL PROPERTY AcQuIsmioN IN FEDERAL AND FEDERALLY AssisTm
PROGRAMS 1 n.1 (Comm. Print. 1964), noted in ADvisoRY CommissIoN ON INTER-
GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONs, RELOCATION: UNEQUAL TREATMENT OF PEOPLE AND Busi-
NESSES DIsPLAcED BY GOVERNmENT (1965); Fried, Grieving for a Lost Home: Psychologi-
cal Costs of Relocation, in THE URBAN CotrarioN ch. 12 (L. Duhl ed. 1963); Hartman,
The Housing of Relocated Families, 30 J. Am. INsT. P ENNmEs 266 (1964).
8 6RE~oRT OF ma NATIONAL ADVISORY CommissioN ON Cvm. DISORDERS 257, 259-60
(1968) (0. Kerner, Chairman).
87Note, Family Relocation in Urban Renewal, supra note 4. By March 31, 1961,
the urban renewal program had eliminated 126,000 low-rent homes and replaced them
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from one slum to another before the bulldozer, often being relocated
three or four times in a few years," 88 federal judges were making state-
ments similar to the ironic declaration of the court in a case in which
plaintiffs had alleged that blacks were being driven out to create a "no-
Negro buffer zone" 8 9 between a shopping area and surrounding resi-
dential community on Chicago's south side:
This Court is aware of the problems to be solved in the relocation
of persons displaced by urban renewal plans. However, if this litiga-
tion were permitted to restrain the civic action, it would be standing
in the path of progress already made and perpetuating the de facto
segregation already existing to the detriment of those that this action
purportedly seeks to protect.9 0
Though there were isolated instances where various provisions of the
Housing Act of 1949 were held to support standing to sue federal and
local urban renewal administrators,91 federal courts consistently denied
standing to private citizens seeking to enforce the relocation require-
ments of section 105 (c). Reasons given by the judges in their decisions
in favor of urban renewal agencies "mesh so poorly with decisions in
allied standing cases that other explanations must be sought for their
willingness to leave displacees out in the cold." 92 Since it seems clear,
with about 28,000 homes, most of them in a much higher rent bracket. M. ANDERsoN,
Tim FEDERAL BuLuLozE 67 (1964).
By 1967, as noted by Richard Cloward of the School of Social Work of Co-
lumbia University, urban renewal and highway construction had demolished
700,000 low rental units during the 15-year period involved while urban renewal
had built at the most 100,000 new units. Center for the Study of Democratic
Institutions, Center Diary: 18, p. 27 (May-June 1967).
Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 1, Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment
Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968).
88 C. ABRAMS, supra note 85, at 148. The author cites a survey of 709 tenants of a
site required for public housing which showed that 49% moved into sections mapped
for future development. NEw YoRK Crrv PLANNING CoMmIssiON, TENANT RELOCATION
REPoRT (Jan. 23, 1954).
89 Green Street Ass'n v. Daley, 250 F. Supp. 139, 141 (N.D. IMI. 1966), aff'd, 373 F.2d
1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 932 (1967)
90 Id. at 147.
91 Gart v. Cole, 263 F.2d 244 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 978 (1959) (construing
5 101(c) of the Housing Act of 1949, 42 U.S.C. 5 1451(c) (Supp. IV, 1969)); Merge v.
Sharott, 341 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1965) (finding a displaced business had standing to
challenge HHFA determination of moving expenses under S 114 of the Act). See
notes 58, 63 supra and accompanying text.
92 Note, Judicial Review of Displacee Relocation in Urban Renewal, 77 YALE L.J.
966,969-70 (1968).
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if not self-evident, that "the interest which displacees have in being re-
located in decent, safe and sanitary housing is no less important than
any other interest, 'competitive' or otherwise, which has been given
statutory protection," 3 the studied refusal of the federal courts to
grant relief to largely indigent casualties of urban renewal campaigns
does not seem adequately explained by obeisance to mistaken concep-
tions of the law of standing or indifference to human suffering. The
reasons would seem to be more deeply rooted. Though various theories
have been suggested for judicial timidity in review of urban renewal
cases,94 the relocation cases resist, if not defy, analysis. Candor does not
surface as a special virtue in the decisions.
The Ninth Circuit in Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency 95 was first
to deal with section 105 (c). While the court seemed to indicate in one
line of reasoning that displacees could not seek judicial relief until they
had exhausted their administrative remedies by taking advantage of the
expertise of the housing administrator, it also decided that, in the final
analysis, standing would never obtain no matter how exhaustively ad-
ministrative remedies were pursued. 6 The court rejected the theory
that the plaintiffs were third-party beneficiaries of the contract between
the Local Public Agencies (LPA) and the IHIFA with the right to
seek judicial enforcement of the statutory conditions imposed on the
agencies.9 7 This reason for the rejection was not well-developed, and
was in fact erroneously premised on decisions such as Gart and the
daTmum absque injzria economic competition decisions in the Second
and Third Circuits.98 Yet the interest of the inhabitants of the renewal
9 3 Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 935-36 (2d
Cir. 1968).
9-See Note, Urban Renewal: Problems of Eliminating and Preventing Urban
Deterioration, 72 HARv. L. REv. 504, 518-19 (1959).
95 317 F.2d 872 (9th Ci.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 915 (1963).
96 317 F.2d at 874.
9 .l
98 Gart v. Cole, 263 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1959), had held just the opposite-that
'displacees (actually in Gart potential relocatees) did have standing to enforce statutes
enacted for their benefit. See notes 51-61 supra and accompanying text. The other two
cases, Allied-City Wide, Inc. v. Cole, 230 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1956), and Pittsburgh Hotels
.Ass'n v. Urban Redevelopment Authority, 309 F.2d 186 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372
U.S. 916 (1963), hinge on Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 US. 464 (1938). Allied-City
involved an attempt to stop an entire urban redevelopment project because plaintiffs
would be put out of business without compensation. The two-paragraph, per curiam
decision simply held that injuries sustained by another's lawful use of money "has no
standing to assert that a third person's action in providing the money will be illegal,"
230 F.2d at 828, citing immediately thereafter Alabama Power. Pittsburgh Hotels was
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sites was significantly and qualitatively different, both in human and
legal terms, from that of businessmen avoiding competition. Clearly,
the Ninth Circuit's decision was "an unwarranted refusal to afford
judicial protection to the families' interests" 91 in relocation. The
absolute refusal by the court to intervene in the administration of
section 105(c) at the instance of site families seems an abdication of
the court's traditional institutional responsibility to insure that ad-
ministrative action is confined to the bounds of agency discretion and
authority.100
The abdication of the Johnson court becomes even more painfully
evident when the inadequacy of the administrative process is unmasked.
In its suggestion "that parties who are in the process of being relocated
may present their grievances, if any, to the Administrator, who is able
to protect the interests of private individuals," 101 the Ninth Circuit
suggested nothing at all. It is increasingly clear that the LPA and the
Relocation Assistance Administration (RAA) do not adequately repre-
sent the interests of relocatees but often compromise their interests with
those whose political and economic futures and fortunes depend upon
successful completion of the renewal projects. This often requires the
subordination of relocation and low-income housing goals to other con-
siderations. A student of the relocation process has written:
The interests of relocatees are not always compatible with those of
the business and civic leaders of the community. The leaders are in-
strictly an economic competition case in which one group of hotel owners tried to
enjoin private persons from erecting transient facilities on land of the urban re-
development authority on the grounds that there was no need for additional facilities
and that no survey of the need had been made as required by statute. In Alabama
Power, the Supreme Court decided that a private electric power company lacked
standing to sue to enjoin the Government from undertaking lend-and-grant agreements
with certain Alabama municipalities which would enable the cities to construct their
own electricity distribution centers. The injury petitioner would have suffered was the
loss of business resulting from the erection of rival and competing plants. The Court
held the
municipalities have the right under state law to engage in the business in
competition with petitioner, since it has been given no exclusive franchise. If
its business be curtailed or destroyed by the operations of the municipalities, it
will be by lawful competition from which no legal wrong results.
302 U.S. at 480.
9 Note, Protecting the Standing of Renewal Site Families to Seek Review of Com-
munity Relocation Planning, 73 YAIm L.J. 1080, 1084 (1964).
100 Id. at 1086 (footnote omitted).
If" 317 F.2d at 875.
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terested in the increased tax base that results from a renewal project,
in revitalization of the downtown business district to offset competi-
tion from suburban shopping centers, and in luring the middle class
back into the cities. These goals are achieved by using the renewal
land for just about any purpose except low income housing; the more
such housing is included in the renewal plan, the less land there is with
which to satisfy the major objectives of these groups. 02
Almost simultaneously with the Ninth Circuit's decision in Johnson,
the Seventh Circuit decided in Harrison-Halsted Community Group,
Inc. v. HHFA10 3 that residents and potential displacees had no standing
to contest selection of their homes and neighborhood as the site for an
extension of the University of Illinois and to challenge the feasibility of
the plan under which many of the plaintiffs were to be relocated. For
purposes of this study, Harrison-Halsted is far more significant than
Johnson.10 4 Plaintiffs, premising standing on the federal question pro-
visions of 28 U.S.C. § 1331105 and on sections 10(a) and (c) of the APA,
attacked both the relocation plan and the entire redevelopment scheme.
Unfortunately for plaintiffs (a circumstance the court made much of),
they had originally favored a renewal plan for the area on Chicago's
near west side when they thought it was going to provide largely com-
mercial redevelopment with advantageous economic implications for
residents of the community. However, when city officials replaced the
earlier decision for commercial redevelopment with a plan for what
amounted to a huge educational park, the residents realized they were
going to be removed, not renewed. Consequently, they became vigor-
ous opponents of the city's plan for the area, rather than the enthusiastic
supporters they had theretofore been. Thus, the challenge was con-
strued by the court as an effort to win by lawsuit what had been lost
in the political-legislative process--a decision about the reuse of the land
which accorded with their own immediate interests.106 Berman was
invoked to support the court's refusal to intervene:
10 2 Tondro, supra note 47, at 198 (footnotes omitted).
103 310 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 914 (1963).
104 Johnson was decided May 17, 1963, Harrison-Halsted November 28, 1962. Yet the
Johnson opinion makes no reference to Harrison-Halsted, though it would have been
far stronger precedent than any of the cases relied upon by the Ninth Circuit.
1o5 The court disposed of this theory of standing at the end of the opinion in 15
words: "As plaintiffs have failed to establish any standing to sue in this federal court
action, . . . the decision of the District Court, dismissing the amended complaint . . .
is afirmed." 310 F.2d at 106 (emphasis added).
10N Plaintiffs had no objection, in fact, they favored the original slum clearance
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The use to which plaintiffs desired the land to be put is undeniably
a lawful public use. But, using the area acquired as a site for the
Chicago branch of the University of Illinois is likewise a lawful public
use. Courts have consistently denied the standing of citizens to chal-
lenge the choice made by public authorities between different and
competing public uses. The legislature, through its lawfully created
agencies, rather than "interested" citizens, is the guardian of the
public needs to be served by social legislation.10 7
The same trust the Johnson court said it placed in the administrative
process was placed by the Seventh Circuit in the Illinois state courts.
Plaintiffs were advised that the court had "no right or justification to
speculate that the state courts of Illinois will not protect any rights the
plaintiffs may have." 10s "Rights," perhaps, the Illinois courts might
well protect. But the result, as the court must have known, was pre-
ordained-the residents would lose. For in state condemnation pro-
ceedings the question would simply be how much would be paid for the
land, not whether the land should be taken.
As to standing under the APA, the court readily compared the plight
of the residents to that of the private power company in Kansas City
Power & Light Co. v. McKay.109 There it had been held that petitioners
enjoyed no right of review simply because they had suffered economic
loss as a result of federally supported power programs." 0  What was
program. They voiced vigorous objections, however, when the proposed plan
for redevelopment of the area was changed from residential and commercial uses
to the University of Illinois-Chicago campus project. They argued that their
interests and the interests of the community would be better served were the
area to be redeveloped for residential and commercial use.
Id. at 105.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 106. Prospects of winning in a state condemnation proceeding have been
called "forlorn," because a court "almost certainly will acquiesce in the city's plan
and limit relief to monetary compensation for property taken." Berger & Cogen,
Responsive Urban Renewal: The Neighborhood Shapes the Plan, 1 anUBA L. AwNuiAL.
75, 77 (1968); cf. City of Chicago v. R. Zwick Co, 27 Ill. 2d 128, 188 N.E.2d 489,
appeal dismissed sub nom. Gonzalez v. City of Chicago, 373 U.S. 542 (1963); Deerfield
Park Dist. v. Progress Dev. Corp., 22 IMI. 2d 132, 174 N.E.2d 850 (1961).
109 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884 (1955).
110 As mentioned earlier, see notes 45-46 supra and accompanying text, Professor
Davis has been critical of so unimaginative a reading of the APA on this question.
However, Professor Jaffe believes "Judge Washington, writing for the court [in
McKay], regarded the provision of APA, correctly in my opinion, as no more than
declaratory of existing law." L. JAFF, supra note 1, at 525. Professor Davis thinks
the phrase "adversely affected" must be read as though it were amplified by the language
used in both the House and Senate committee reports on the pending bill. S. Doc. No.
248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 212, 276 (1946). "This subsection confers a right of review
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needed to get standing under the APA according to MAIcKay was a "legal
wrong." Although the Harrison-Halsted court admitted that plaintiffs.
were adversely affected and aggrieved,11' they had suffered no "legal
wrong" and were not aggrieved-in the court's view-within the meaning
of any relevant statute, as is supposedly required by the APA. Thus,.
plaintiffs were both out of court and (as attested by the striking archi-
tecture of the University of Illinois campus) out of the area. The court
acknowledged the allegations concerning the relocation grievances, but
failed specifically to treat them in the opinion, swallowing relocation and
other issues raised by the plaintiffs in the discussion of the APA and the
questions of public use controlled by Berman.
Some five year later, however, Harrison-Halsted was cited by the same
circuit court in Green Street Association v. Daley"12 as it denied standing
to relocatees in another area of the same city. Evidently overlooking the
fact that it had never really articulated its reasoning on the relocation
issues in Harrison-Halsted, the court declared, "[w] e see no reason to
reexamine our position [on relocation] in that case." 113
Ironically, the court was nearly trapped by one of its own precedents-
Progress Development Corp. v. Mitchell.114 There it had held that
plaintiff real estate developers stated a "federal cause of action" when
they sought to enjoin Deerfield, Illinois, officials from condemning land
for alleged park purposes that the plaintiffs had purchased on which to
construct an interracial subdivision. Village officials of the exclusively
white suburb commenced condemnation proceedings immediately after
announcement of the developer's integration scheme. The developers
charged in their suit that the corporation's civil rights were being
upon any person adversely affected in fact by agency action or aggrieved within the
meaning of any statute." 3 K. DAvis, supra note 45, 5 22.02, at 212 (emphasis added).
Professor Jaffe is impressed by the omission of the words "in fact." L. JrA, supra
note 1, at 529.
1lFor instance, relying on earlier promises by the City of Chicago that the area
was to be designated for conservation and redeveloped by rehabilitation and spot
clearance, residents of the area and owners of businesses therein relocated in adjacent
areas with the expectation of returning after Harrison-Halsted had been redeveloped. A
new parish school, replacing one that had given way to an expressway, was built in the
heart of the area upon assurance that it would fit with the redevelopment plan. As
it turned out, the school was consistent with the earlier plan, but conflicted with the
subsequent scheme to turn the entire area over to the University, and the new building
had to be demolished. 310 F.2d at 101. The court acknowledged the "outraged feelings
of many people who have interests in this area:' Id. at 103.
112 373 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 932 (1967).
113 Id. at 7.
114 286 F.2d 222 (7th Cir. 1961).
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violated, and that the property was sought, not in furtherance of any
public purpose to develop a park, but as a conspiracy to deny plaintiffs
equal protection of the laws.""'
In Green Street, the site occupants also alleged a conspiracy between
the city and commercial interests to create in the Central Englewood
area a "no-Negro buffer zone" between the shopping area and the 85
percent black residential area, which in just a few years had surrounded
what had formerly been an all-white, working class neighborhood. The
plan was alleged to be discriminatory as well as violative of due process,
since it was approved without adequate hearing and its relocation pro-
visions were geared to the patterns of residential segregation prevalent
in Chicago."" The Green Street Association, a residents' organization,
and 125 individual black property owners and lessees filed suit to have
the project declared invalid and to enjoin eminent domain proceedings
planned for 300 buildings, consisting of 600 dwelling units. Standing
in Green Street was bottomed not only on section 10 of the APA but
also on the substantial federal question provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§ 13 31 (a).117
115 Ultimately the village was successful in its scheme to convert the interracial
housing site into a park and the recreational site now "serves" the community.
116 373 F.2d at 1-2. The Central Englewood Area was a 75-acre section of a 3,000-
acre tract which had been designated as the Englewood Conservation Area pursuant
to Illinois statute almost ten years before the lawsuit was commenced. Twenty-two
acres of the Central project area were residential, 27 acres nonresidential. More than $13
million in public funds were authorized for the scheme which called for new streets,
parking lots and other improvements allegedly incidental to the "revitalization" of the
shopping area which served the entire Englewood area.
1 The federal questions were supposedly presented by several civil rights violations,
although the court really dealt only with the conspiracy allegation under 42 U.S.C.
S 1983 (1964). However, the plaintiffs also claimed they were being deprived of
their rights under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1964), as applied
by the Supreme Court to prohibit the refusal of a Missouri developer to sell a sub-
division dwelling to an interracial couple, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409
(1968), discussed in Kohl, The Civil Rights Act of 1866, Its Hour Come Round at Last,
55 VA. L. REv. 272 (1969), and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. S 2000(d)
(1964), which reads:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance.
The plaintiffs charged that the urban renewal plan acknowledged the existence of a
segregated housing market in Chicago and listed separate relocation facilities based on
race for displacees. It is interesting to note that HUD now requires, to forestall LPA
overstatement of available relocation facilities for nonwhites, a white-nonwhite break-
down in classifying displacees and housing resources. See Note, Judicial Review of
Displacee Relocation in Urban Renewal, 77 YALa LJ. 966, 979 n.63 (1968).
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In affirming the dismissal of the district court,'-" the court devoted
much of its opinion to distinguishing the conspiracy in the suburb from
that in the city. While it is unclear why the court's earlier civil rights
stance in the Progress Development case was not equally applicable to
the Englewood blacks in Green Street, three factors were given special
prominence. First, the court said that the Central Englewood Project
"is an integral part of a large conservation and urban renewal program
undertaken by the City of Chicago," 119 apparently attempting to dis-
tinguish between a large, long range plan, and the precipitate Progress
Development decision to create a park. Second, the court cited the
absence of an allegation-present in the Progress Development complaint
-that the project was designed solely to deprive plaintiffs of owning
property.120 Finally, the court construed the Green Street complaint as
questioning the motives of the planners for condemning the land. The
court emphasized this construction of the complaint in denying standing,
holding "the subjective reasons of the legislative authority seeking the
acquisition" is an "inappropriate area for judicial inquiry," '2 ' although
the court had previously held it proper to explore motive in Progress
Development, which it now termed an "exceptional" case.122
Other than its tortuous and strained avoidance of the problems raised
by the Progress Development case, the Green Street court came to
grips neither with the constitutional issues, raised for the first time in
the context of a relocation case, nor questions raised by section 105(c)
of the Housing Act and section 10 of the APA.
The Green Street decision illustrates "the extreme reluctance of courts,
both state and federal, to touch an urban renewal case where an ap-
proved plan is under attack." 12 3 Somewhat complex explanations have
been suggested for judicial reticence to review urban renewal ques-
tions:
What lies at the root of the court's self-denial is reluctance to unravel
a plan that has been many years in the making, that has built up com-
118 See note 89 supra.
119 373 F.2d at 6.
10 Id.
12 1 Id. But as to motive questioning, see Developments in the Law: Equal Protection
82 HtAv. L. REv. 1065, 1097 (1969):
On the other hand, the courts do not appear as unwilling to examine the
motives behind unequal administrative action and to strike down such action if it
[was taken solely for racially discriminatory reasons].
122373 F.2d at 7.
123 Berger & Cogen, supra note 108, at 78.
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munity expectations, and that has presented several opportunities for
discussion, persuasion and attack during its years of preparation. This
unwillingness, in turn, is responsive to the widely shared opinion that
the courtroom is the improper milieu for planning (or unplanning)
the physical and human development of a community. Moreover,
even the delay of such a plan for the course of a trial and inevitable
appeals might set in motion a wave of repercussions that would be
difficult to foresee and which few judges would risk unleashing on a
community. During this interim, while condemnation is stayed, land
values might rise, increasing project costs beyond the limits of local
and federal funds committed or even available to the venture; demand
conditions might change, so as to undo the reuse assumptions that
underpin the renewal scheme; the terms and availability of construc-
tion financing or municipal borrowing might become less advanta-
geous; existing community or political support for the program might
despair and vanish; federal moneys might be diverted to citizens
ready to proceed; urgently needed public improvements, such as
schools and neighborhood centers, which depend upon the urban re-
newal scheme for their financing, might be indefinitely delayed; and
assuming the neighborhood is indeed a "blighted" one, the deterioration
might get far worse and even spread. 24
Another and less complicated rationalization of judicial abdication
in the urban renewal cases might be that the political strength of the
displacees is too diffused and lacks sufficient economic support to with-
stand the larger and more powerful forces that compel the adoption of
a renewal scheme. The real answer might well be that the courts 'would
not disturb renewal schemes, not that they could not. The school de-
segregation cases, 125 reapportionment and welfare cases'26 demonstrate
the capacity and flexibility of courts to confront complex, allegedly
124 Id. at 78. Berger and Cogen demonstrate that the organization, expertise and
effectiveness of a community organization vitally determine whether opportunities to be
heard are seized. The bitter experience of the Harrison-Halsted residents and the black
business men of Nashville recorded in (or perhaps memorialized by) Nashville 1-40
Steering Comm. v. Ellington, 387 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 921
(1968), indicates the disasters that can befall groups that fail either to mount effective
coalitions or move quickly against accomplished facts.
1 25 See, e.g., Judge J. Skelly Wright's imaginative decision in Hobson v. Hansen,
269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1968), in which he
committed the court to a rigorous and thorough-going exploration of educational
policies in an effort to make them nondiscriminatory, regardless of their intent. See
Carter, Equal Educational Opportunity for Negroes-Abstractionz or Reality, 1968
Ix. L.F. 160.
126 Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
19701
856 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 56:826
"tionjusticiable" questions when there is a sufficiently powerful social
and political consensus that they do so.127
Such a consensus was indeed coalescing even while the Seventh Cir-
cuit was washing its hands of the Englewood controversy. The rising
sense of the national urgency over the "problems of the cities," that
new euphemism for the recurrent and age-old American racial agony,
found expression the very next year in two decisions128 in which courts
decided they could no longer afford a "see no evil" policy in urban
renewal cases. "What everybody knows the court[s] must know." 129
The Kerner Commission stated that "[h]ousing grievances were found
in almost all of the cities studied and appeared to be among the most
serious complaints in a majority of them." 1s0
Segregated housing in the cities is the most visible manifestation of
the social disease from which America suffers; segregated public hous-
ing in the cities shows the disease in its most virulent and noxious
form. And the existence of segregated public housing is the fault of the
government, just as government must accept a major position of the
blame for the continuation of segregation in private housing.131
But in most instances blacks and disadvantaged groups, the overwhelm-
ing majority of displacees, are unable to find remedies for their com-
plaints. In all too many instances, they are confronted with decision-
making organs indifferent and even hostile to their plight. Ample cor-
roboration for this reality of powerlessness and consequential frustra-
tion was also uncovered by the Kerner Commission:
The political structure was a source of grievance in almost all of the
cities and was among the most serious complaints in several. There
were significant grievances concerning the lack of adequate represen-
tation of Negroes in the political structure, the failure of local political
127 See generally Note, Toward a Constitutionally Protected Environment, 56 VA. L.
REv. 458, 481-86 (1970).
12 8 ,Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968),
discussed at text following note 142 infra; Powelton Civic Home Owners Ass'n v. HUD,
284 F. Supp. 809 (ED. Pa. 1968).
129Meredith v. Fair, 305 F.2d 343, 344-45 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 828
(1962), citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 30 (1905).
130REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 81 (1968)
(footnote omitted).
131 P. JACOBS, PRELUDE TO RIOT: A VIEW OF URBAN AMERICA FROM THE Borrom 169
(Vintage ed. 1968).
1970] Urban Renewal
structures to respond to legitimate complaints and the absence or ob-
scurity of official grievance channels. 32
Perhaps in recognition of this oppression of blacks and inner city
inhabitants, Congress has groped for ways to alleviate some of the socially
dysfunctional aspects of urban renewal. Aside from successive emphasis
on the goals of adequate rehousing for the poor and seeking more ef-
fective ways of providing housing for displacees, 13 there has been a
recognition that demolition of the existing housing stock is not neces-
sarily the best way to provide adequate shelter for the poor.1 4 The
1964 amendments to the Housing Act of 1949 required enforcement of
housing codes as part of the price of participation in urban renewal.135
The HUD Administrator is also forbidden to approve contracts pro-
viding for demolition unless he "determines that the objectives of the
urban renewal plan could not be achieved through rehabilitation of the
project area." 16 With increased legislative and political accommoda-
tion to the exigencies of national housing problems, 37 accompanied by
132 Id.
133 Note, Judicial Review of Displacee Relocation in Urban Renewal, 77 YALE L.J.
966, 984 (1968).
134 See L. FRIDMmAN, GOVERN NT AND SLUM HoUsiNG 69-72 (1968). "The most
acute housing problem for America's poor is ...the continuing shortage of decent
housing at a cost it can afford." Farnsworth, The City in the Recent Past, 1 Rtr=s
CAAies L.J. 1, 9 (1969).
13542 U.S.C. S 1451(c) (Supp. IV, 1969). Professor Frances Fox Piven of Co-
lumbia University's School of Social Work has indicated, however, that massive code
enforcement would result in boarding up many urban structures because of the pro-
hibitive cost of repairs. She sees this as a way of creating the kind of "crisis" necessary
to marshal a consensus so that effective, not stop-gap, measures will be devised to
house the poor. See Piven & Cloward, Rent Strike: Disrupting the SIwn Systev; NEw
REPUBLic, Dec. 2, 1967, at 11, 14.
136 Housing Act of 1949, § 110(c), 42 U.S.C. § 1460(c) (Supp. IV, 1969).
137 Urban renewal is no longer exceptional, and cities are expected to have re-
development programs .... [WIhere renewal has succeeded, powerful real estate,
political and commercial interests have come to depend on the federal largess.
Urban renewal has become a significant source of political patronage, and con-
siderable local resources have become committed to continued action to the point
that they will be difficult to extract .... [WIhereas in an earlier day the primary
political problems were overcoming apathy and winning the support of conserva-
tive business elements in the community, today's opposition increasingly comes
from organized and disaffected slumdwellers themselves. Where such groups exist,
they should heighten the interest of local politicians in achieving adequate re-
location. Thus, not only is the local program stronger and more resilient today
than a few years ago, but also there are independent forces shifting the politics
of renewal in the direction of better relocation.
Note, Judicial Review of Displacee Relocation in Urban Renewal, 77 YALE L.J. 966,
985-86 (1968).
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the gathering storm of black dissent and revolt, the time has arrived
for the judiciary to disavow its past evasion and disingenuousness, and
to assume a more active role in the urban renewal controversy.3 8
Norwalk CORE AND NASCENT JUDIcIAL ACTIVISM
The supremacy of law demands that there shall be opportunity to have
some court decide whether an erroneous rule of law was applied .... 139
Toward Equal Protection in Urban Renewal
In Green Street, plaintiffs charged urban renewal officials with im-
plementing a strategy to drive blacks from a shopping area in order to
create a "no-Negro buffer zone." The plan was claimed to have run
afoul of constitutional requirements of due process and equal protection
because the Chicago City Council had approved it without adequate re-
hearing, and because the relocation plans helped to reinforce the existing
patterns of segregated housing. The displacees were held, however, to
have no standing to litigate their assertions.140
The next year, blacks and Puerto Ricans made similar assertions-
though perhaps more precisely phrased and amplified-about an urban
138 Judges may have some preparation for this proposed shift in role by the activity
of federally funded legal services programs. Though generally legal services lawyers
have yet to emphasize urban renewal litigation, their imaginative efforts on behalf of
welfare recipients, slum tenants and other disadvantaged persons have undoubtedly
helped sensitize the courts to the need to make more tangible the law's purported
equality.
For a comprehensive survey of the Office of Economic Opportunity Legal Service
Programs, see Note, Neighborhood Law Offices: The New Wave in Legal Services for
the Poor, 80 HARv. L. Ray. 805 (1967). An excellent symposium, Justice and the Poor,
appears in 41 NomE DAmn LAwymt 843 (1966).
It must be noted, however, that the salutary impact of legal services lawyers upon
appellate judges does not necessarily influence trial level proceedings. A recent study
for the OEO gives a bleak picture of the hostile and negative attitude of the bench in
the San Francisco Bay area towards law reform activity on behalf of the poor:
[The] critical element in local lawyers' and judges' opposition to the program
is their apparent inability to perceive the legal process as an instrument of social
change.... The fact that many private practitioners and local judges not only
refuse to accept, but do not even understand, this essential role of law in society
has become a serious stumbling block for a program that offers one of the more
promising alternatives to the use of violence as a means of solving social prob-
lems.
Stumpf & Janowitz, Judges and the Poor: Bench Responses to Federally Financed
Legal Serzices 21 ST". L. Rav. 1058, 1075-76 (1969).
13 9 St. Joseph Stock Yards v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 84 (1936) (Brandeis, J,
concurring).--
140 See text at notes 112-24 supra.
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renewal plan in Norwalk, Connecticut. Though the district court de-
nied relief to the plaintiffs, 41 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held
in Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency 4 2 (Norwalk
I) that displacees of an urban renewal scheme have standing to sue in
federal court when constitutional and legislative measures designed for
their protection are violated. The widely discussed opinion signalled
a return by the federal courts to both traditional and more realistic
notions of standing. 4 3 It was also part of a deepening and more imagina-
tive conception of the requirements of equal protection. 144 Furthermore,
the justiciability conundrum was candidly and effectively confronted.
The facts of the case followed an all too familiar pattern. 45 The
Norwalk Redevelopment Agency planned erection of commercial office
buildings and a middle-income housing project on low-income housing
sites, the demolition of which required the displacement of 271 families
-nearly half of them black or Puerto Rican. The agency commenced
demolition heedless of the uncontroverted facts that the pervasive com-
munity discrimination in housing severely restricted shelter to blacks
and Puerto Ricans, that the vacancy rate in low-cost public housing in
the city was wholly inadequate to meet the needs of the displacees, and
that the minority group families who could find shelter were being
forced into overcrowded and substandard housing at double the rents
charged whites for superior facilities. The destruction of black and
Puerto Rican homes continued although the Agency knew that plain-
tiffs "were being subjected to such hardships and deprivations in con-
nection with relocation (not experienced to any substantially equal de-
gree by white families in the City) that many were being forced to
leave the City entirely." 146
'41 Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 42 F.RD. 617 (D. Conn.
1967), rev'd, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968).
142 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968).
143Several law reviews have noted-and saluted-this landmark decision. See
43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1257 (1963); 20 SYRAcusE L. REv. 157 (1968); 14 Vn.L. L. REv. 149
(1968); 10 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 482 (1968). See also Note, The Federal Courts and
Urban Renewal, 69 CoLuM. L. Rnv. 472, 494, 508-09 (1969); Note, Family Relocation
in Urban Renewal, supra note 4, at 890-95; Comment, Judicial Review in Urban Re-
newal Cases, 57 GEo. L.J. 615 (1969).
144 The equal protection aspects of Norwalk are emphasized in 4 HARV. Civ. RIGiTS-
Ci. LiB. L. REv. 176 (1968).
145 The Norwalk 1 story is taken largely from the plaintiffs-appellants' brief and
partly from the opinion. "Since the action was dismissed, the allegations of the com-
plaint ... must be accepted as true." 395 F.2d at 924.
146 !d. This was "Negro removal" with a vengeance. Most "Negro removal" schemes
have involved shifting blacks around the city. Banishment and exile has either been
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Plaintiffs, headed by the somewhat militant local chapter of the
Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), i47 sought injunctive relief to
prevent the City and Agency from conveying six acres of cleared land
within the project area to a private developer who planned the erection
of moderate-income housing and from further demolition until site
occupants were properly relocated. Plaintiffs sought an order compelling
defendants "to provide with all deliberate speed... low-rental housing
units" and "to have such a program administered under court jurisdiction
and control." 148
Regarding the threshold question of the plaintiffs' standing, the court
affirmed the contention that section 105(c) 149 was enacted by Congress
to confer upon displacees a "legal right" to protection.
[T]he fact that Congress intended to protect the specific interests of
displacees when it enacted the section is enough to give the displacees
standing, in the absence of a persuasive reason to believe that Congress
intended to cut off judicial review. Judicial review obtains not only
to advance what have traditionally been viewed as "legal rights," but
also to vindicate the public interest, and Congress has made clear its
view that adequate relocation is in the public interest.150
In looking "to the traditional principles of standing," 151 the Second
Circuit brought the problems in judicial consideration of urban renewal
seen as unnecessarily eroding the surplus labor pool, or else infrequently resorted to
because less drastic effects were consistent with the project.
147 Waverly Yates, Norwalk CORE Director, described urban renewal as "a pro-
gram used to disenfranchise black people." Address by Waverly Yates, Norwalk
CORE Director, National Lawyers Guild Second Regional Conference on Government
Assisted Low- and Middle-Income Housing at Columbia University School of Law,
June 6, 1969.
148Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 7, Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment
Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968).
149 Section 105(c) of the Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1455(c) (1) (Supp. IV, 1969),
provides that contracts for loans or capital grants shall require the availability or the
provision of "decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings" for displacees "not generally less
desirable in regard to public utilities and public and commercial facilities and at rents
or prices within [their] financial means ... :'
150 395 F.2d at 934. The court several times used "legal right" as a quoted phrase,
perhaps in allusion to section 10 of the A-PA. Standing was not, however, bottomed on
the APA, although in a footnote the court adopted the construction placed on the
Act in Hadin v. Kentucky Util. Co, 390 U.S. 1 (1968) that the "person ag-
grieved" category of section 10 does not limit judicial review to those situations where
Congress has explicitly referred to persons "adversely affected or aggrieved" by agency
action, but may give standing to implied beneficiaries of the Act. 395 F.2d at 933 n.26.
1 43 N.Y.U.L. RFv. 1257, 1258 (1968).
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programs into the increasingly liberal currents of judicial review.15 2
Indeed, it all but reaffirmed and extended its prior conception of standing
in Gart.
The traditional, and even common law, origins of the court's position
are evident from Judge Smith's citation of Mr. Justice Brandeis' opinion
in The Chicago Junction Case.5 3 In that case, rival railroad trunk lines
sought to enjoin the Interstate Commerce Commission from permitting
New York Central to acquire control over what had hitherto been an
independent terminal railroad in Chicago. The acquisition had the effect
of giving New York Central a monopoly over use of the terminal fa-
cilities, subjecting other carriers to serious economic disadvantage and
prejudice.'1 Justice Brandeis viewed the loss as not incident to "more
effective competition," but incident to denial of "equality of treat-
ment." 155 Declaring that the rival railroads had a "special interest" 156
in the ICC order, Justice Brandeis declared the plaintiffs had standing
152 The dramatic developments in the law of standing are evident at all levels of the
federal court system. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-104 (1968) (federal tax-
payers have standing to attack expenditure of tax money allegedly in violation of the
establishment clause of the first amendment); Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1,
5-7 (1968) (statutory protection of competition provides injured competitor with stand-
ing); United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1000-06 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (responsible
representatives of listening public have standing to contest renewal of broadcasting
license); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 615-16 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966) (aggrievement need not be economic, but may
be aesthetic in nature); Road Review League v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp. 650, 659-61 (S.D.N.Y.
1967) (APA manifests a congressional intent that towns and civic groups may be
aggrieved by agency action that has disregarded their interests).
'53 264 U.S. 258 (1924). Chicago junction was also persuasive authority for the
Second Circuit's liberal doctrine favoring judicial review, for it was certainly clear
that there was "no persuasive reason" to believe that Congress sought to preclude
review of final HHFA action. Quite the reverse was the case. See Tondro, supra note
102, at 211-12.
That time has not sapped the vitality of Chicago junction may be seen by the
Supreme Court's decision in Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968), that a
power company had standing to challenge TVA supply of power to certain Ten-
nessee towns:
This court has . . . repeatedly held that the economic injury which results from
lawful competition cannot, in and of itself, confer standing on the injured busi-
ness to question the legality of any aspect of its competitor's operations ... . In
contrast, it has been the rule, at least since the Chicago Junction Case, ... that
when the particular statutory provision invoked does reflect a legislative purpose
to protect a competitive interest, the injured competitor has standing to require
compliance with that provision.
Id. at 5-6.
IM 264 U.S. at 266. At the time of the suit, diversion of traffic to New York
Central as a result of the ICC order amounted to more than ten million dollars.




to challenge the Commission's finding that the acquisition was "in the
public interest," thus making standing "rest on a determination that an
interest intended by statute to be protected has been denied that pro-
tection." 157 Similarly, in Norwalk I, the court found that Congress had
recognized the "interest" of displacees "in being relocated in decent,
safe and sanitary housing." 15s Since the court inferred that Congress
intended to insure that dislocatees were protected, it found standing. 59
Having determined that the plaintiffs had the requisite "direct, per-
sonal interest" in the Agency's relocation plans to give them standing
to "vindicate the public interest.., in adequate relocation," 160 the court
was confronted with the essential issue that the Seventh and Ninth Cir-
cuits had effectively dodged-the justiciability of the controversy, or
what dissenting Judge Hays simplistically dichotomized as whether or
not the federal courts could administer the housing program.' 6 '
Review of agency activity in relocation as well as other areas of ad-
ministration of the urban renewal program would seem to embroil the
courts in an essentially political question:
The extent to which relocation of those displaced by urban renewal
-is required will necessarily affect the pace at which urban renewal
can take place, and the priority of goals in urban renewal plan-
ing. Issues are at stake which are, in the truest sense of the
-word, political. For example, if public housing were required to be
available for every displacee of urban renewal, then it would follow,
at least in the present condition of the nation's cities, that the building
of public housing would be assigned very high priority.162
157 L. JAFFE, supra note 1, at 507.
158 395 F.2d at 935-36.
159 I.
160 Id. at 934. In Powelton Civic Home Owners Ass'n v. HUD, 284 F. Supp.
809 (E.D. Pa. 1968), which held two months prior to Norwalk I that section 105(c)
gives relocatees "substantive legal rights," id. at 821, Judge Body anticipated Judge
Smith's theory of standing with even greater clarity than its expression in the Second
Circuit opinion: "They have private individual legal rights; and they are the appropri-
ate representatives of legal rights conferred by the Housing Act on the general public."
Id. See discussion of Powelton in text at notes 186-91 infra. See also Tondro, supra
note 47, at 212:
Even if section 105(c) is viewed as having created "private" rights in relocatees,
they could be found to have standing to seek review as representatives of the
public's interest in enforcement of the section. It is clear that relocatees as a
group will be more likely than members of the public at large to seek enforce-
ment of the public's interest [in] adequate relocation.
161 Judge Hays said that they could not."395 F.2d at 938.
162 Id. at 929.
[Vol. 56:826
Urban Renewal
Having made this concession, Judge Smith asserted that it was Congress,
not the court, that provided the standard for relocation. The constitu-
tional claim that the standard was relaxed in the relocation of blacks and
Puerto Ricans could be reached without consideration of political
questions as to the merits of the standard, and the courts could fashion
remedies to insure that the standard was applied equally to all displacees.
Thus, the court was measuring agency activity against constitutional
requirements in light of congressionally determined standards. Basic
and fundamental policy had been properly hammered out in the po-
litical arena, but case-by-case inquiry would be proper for resolving
problems to be undertaken, "with due regard for the need for judicially
discoverable and manageable standards.., and with recognition of the
role played by the coordinate branches of the Federal Government in
the planning and implementation of urban renewal." 163
The court cited, but did not forcefully apply, the rubber stamp of
Berman. It suggested that, particularly where constitutional ques-
tions were raised, the courts may properly assume a role as monitor
and safeguard of individual rights. 64 These cannot be abandoned to
unreviewed agency discretion. To be sure, such a role involves a hedge
on legislative and executive power, but even the most restrained views
of judicial power recognize the legitimacy and value of judicial review
as a "legal check" upon the other two branches of government. 6 5 Of
such is the "stuff" of checks and balances.
This decision by the people to limit themselves by law-not only by
the idea of law but by the actual processes of law in courts of their
own establishing-is part of the distinctive essence of American de-
mocracy.166
The Norwalk I decision's "recognition of the role played by the co-
ordinate branches of the Federal Government in the planning and imple-
mentation of urban renewal" 167 affirms the need for judicial deference
to the expertise of HUD and LPA in the administration of urban renewal
163 Id.
164The court of course relied heavily upon Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), for
this conception of the dynamic nature of the relationship between the judiciary and
legislature.
165 Cf. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 149 (1950)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); Mendelson, Jefferson on Judicial Review: Consistency
Through Change, 29 U. Cm. L. REv. 327 (1962).
166 C. BLAcK, TiE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 117 (1960).
167 395 F.2d at 929.
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programs. Yet, as Dean Pound pointed out late in life, "the question of
deference does not admit of an answer on strictly analytical lines." 168
Thus the case-by-case inquiry called for in Norwalk I is the only rational
way in which courts can exercise their responsibilities without over-
stepping their bounds.
Certainly, where claims are raised under the equal protection clause,
the judiciary bears a special responsibility for "those about whom the
other branches and divisions of government often will not be con-
cerned." 169 Clearly the Norwalk I decision imaginatively meets the
challenge posed by the constitutional requirement of equal protection
of the laws. It is in fact arguable that Norwalk I turns on equal protec-
tion rather than on construction of a congressional scheme to insure the
interest of relocatees in decent housing and their consequential "legal
right" to enforce that interest.' 0
The Norwalk I plaintiffs alleged that the urban renewal authorities
failed to assure relocation for blacks in the way they had for whites,
and that they even intended, through a combination of the project
and the discrimination in the Norwalk housing market, to drive the
blacks from the city. The court refused to permit the agency to shield
itself from its statutory responsibilities behind the "accident" of segre-
gated housing. Notwithstanding this "accident," the court held that
the planners must still ensure that there is available relocation housing
for all displacees. The court articulated an expansive conception of
equal protection of the laws declaring that it
means more than merely the absence of governmental action designed
to discriminate .... [A]s Judge J. Skelly Wright has said, "We now
firmly recognize that the arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness can be
as disastrous and unfair to private rights and the public interest as the
perversity of a willful scheme." . ..
168 Pound, Foreword to Symposium, Judicial Review: Its Role in Intergovernmental
Relations, 50 GEo. L.J. 653, 658 (1962).
3.6 Choper, On the Warren Court and Judicial Review, 17 GATH. U.. REv. 20, 43
(1967).
170The equal protection claims were asserted with more clarity and vigor in
Norwalk I than in the previous relocation cases, and the court responded far more
vigorously than had the Seventh Circuit in Green Street. See note 112 supra and
accompanying text. The Green Street court called the segregated pattern of housing,
recognized by the Chicago LPA and integral to its relocation scheme, as
accidental to the Plan. The city admittedly could not require relocation in any
particular area; it may only determine what housing is available in fact and offer
whatever assistance it can in furnishing this information to displacees.
373 F.2d at 9.
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Where the relocation standard set by Congress is met for those
who have access to any housing in the community which they can
afford, but not for those who, by reason of their race, are denied free
access to housing they can afford and must pay more for what they
can get, the state action affirms the discrimination in the housing
market. This is not "equal protection of the laws." 171
The fashioning of relief for plaintiffs in Norwalk I involved considera-
tions which encompassed both the constitutional rights of the displacees
and the justiciability of the controversy. Defendants' major contention
had been that the nonjusticiable nature of plaintiffs' claim flowed from
the inevitable involvement of the court in overall urban renewal plan-
ning should it attempt to fashion relief, after a decision on the merits
favorable to plaintiffs. Yet not to extend relief would be to acquiesce in
the violation of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Since the case was
only at the pleadings stage, the court could hazard the prediction that
"we see no reason to believe that the courts are incapable of fashioning
remedies to insure that the standard is equally met for all citizens." 172
It escaped-at least for the time being' 7 -the very real problems of "fash-
ioning remedies" without in fact cutting into the decision-making process
normally reserved to the agency. The decision was framed to avoid
undue undercutting of the planning process by restraining its role to
ensuring that statutory standards are met while leaving the definition
of those standards to Congress.' 74
The Limits of Intervention
Norwalk CORE: Aftermath
Victory in the appellate court is justifiably a source of pride to the
triumphant lawyer, but clients sometimes discover that "winning" a
'17395 F.2d at 931. The passage by Judge Wright adopted by the court is from
Hobsen v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 497 (D.D.C. 1967), appeal disnissed, 393 U.S. 861
(1968).
172 395 F.2d at 935.
173 The "time being" may be a long time. After remand and filing of the mandate,
the lawsuit was placed on the discovery calendar awaiting trial. Inadequate funds
for expenses slowed the taking of depositions. Interview with Stephen L. Fine,
Associate of Lubell and Lubell, attorneys for Norwalk CORE, in New York City,
May 13, 1969.
174 Thus, actually ordering the construction of low-cost housing and thereby forcing
a shift in the allocation of project resources and expenditures-suggested by the




lawsuit is not invariably accompanied by tangible rewards. Tfe frustra-
tion of a "paper victory" is a special hazard of test case litigation, as
the problem of fashioning relief in Norwalk I indicates. Though Judge
Smith indicated that ordering construction of low cost homes was not
the most desirable form of relief, by the time the opinion was handed
down and the case was sent back to the district court, ordering the
building of shelter for the displacee plaintiffs was about the only mean-
ingful relief left.
Plaintiffs never sought money damages because of inherent difficulties
in setting an amount and dividing it among members of the class.175 Also,
a claim for damages might have undercut the plea for affirmative relief.
No attempt was made to appeal the denial of the injunction-partly
because the Seventh and Ninth Circuit precedents'1 6 did not augur well
for the success of the appeal, and certainly did not indicate that the
denial of the injunction would be reversed.
After remand, the lawyers were unsuccessful in obtaining an injunc-
tion after a complicated series of events. As soon as the appeal was
decided and the mandate filed, a plea was made to Judge Zampano, who
had originally heard the matter prior to the appeal, for an injunction to
forbid the city from renting any of the apartments in the new struc-
tures1 77 constructed in accordance with the renewal plan. Judge Zam-
pano caused the case to be reassigned to another judge who refused an
ex parte injunction, ordered a hearing on the prayer for injunctive re-
lief, and required strict compliance with notice procedures. Threatened
with inordinate delay, the lawyers attempted to have the case trans-
ferred to the district court in New Haven. The effort was unsuccess-
ful, and after the Norwalk Housing Authority lost a motion to have the
entire case dismissed, the court ruled that the plaintiffs had abandoned
their petition for an injunction.
Despite this rather complicated sequence of events-and enormous
expenditures of time and energy-all the respective parties to the litiga-
tion, as well as persons indirectly affected by the urban renewal project,
were still in much the same relative position they were when the suit
was filed. The only significant change was that the area had been re-
175 This discussion of the aftermath of the litigation is based on the interview with
Stephen L. Fine, supra note 173.
176 See Green Street Ass'n v. Daley, 373 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S.
932 (1967); Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency, 317 F.2d 872 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 915 (1963).




developed in basic conformance with the plan, and the process of dis-
persal had largely run its course.
Norwalk CORE: Sequel and the Alternatives of Relief
The rapid and dramatic expansion of judicial review of urban renewal
programs is illustrated by the fact that the year after the Norwalk I
decision-and while the case was pending trial-the same federal and ap-
pellate courts had to dispose of another dispute between displacees and
developers in Norwalk. Some of the alternatives of relief and some of
the problems courts face in this difficult and complex area are suggested
by Norwalk CORE v. David Katz & Sons, Inc.178 (Norwalk Il). In
Norwalk II, relocatees asked a Second Circuit Court of Appeals panel 79
to overturn an order denying an injunction against their eviction. The
plaintiff-family sought to remain in the apartment into which they had
been relocated following the demolition of their former apartment
building pursuant to the plan attacked in Norwalk L
Defendant David Katz & Sons, Inc., a "preferred sponsor" of the
urban renewal project, managed the Carlton Court apartments into
which plaintiffs Frank and Ethel Williams were placed on a referral
from the Norwalk Redevelopment Agency. The Williamses paid a
reduced rental-$130 monthly-because of the preferred status of Katz,
Katz itself making up the difference. This reduced rental resulted from
the contract between HUD and the Norwalk Redevelopment Agency
which provided that displacees be relocated into housing within their
financial means.180 This provision was controlled by the HUD (then
HHFA) regulation which declared standards for "ability of displacees
to pay" are to be expressed "in terms of gross rent as a percentage of
income." 181 The percentage used in the Norwalk project was twenty
percent of the family income.
The Williams family shared the apartment with another couple, the
Davises; their combined income fixed the amount of the rent. When
the Davises moved, the Williamses ceased paying the $130 rental. They
then applied to the district court to enjoin Katz & Sons from concluding
178 410 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1969).
179 Judge Smith, who wrote Norwvalk I, was replaced by the author of Norwalk 11,
Judge Feinberg. Judges Kaufman and Hays, who respectively concurred and dis-
sented in Norwalk 1, completed the Norwalk 11 panel.
180 This provision was in conformance with section 105(c) of the Housing and
Urban Development Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 1 1445 (c) (Supp. IV, 1969).
181HHFA, URmw R.NawA. MAmuA. §§ 16-1, 16-2-1, now HUD, URBAN RENwAL
HANDBOOK RHA 7212.1 '(1968), cited in 410 F.2d at 534.
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evicion proceedings in the Connecticut state courts. They asserted in
support of the application for a preliminary injunction that, as relo-
cated tenants, they could not be evicted because the $130 monthly
rental at the time they were relocated exceeded twenty percent of their
income. They asserted that the Davis couple were "boarders" and that
the Davis income could not properly be combined with theirs as that of
a "family" for the purpose of computing the monthly rent.
Conceding that "the impact of urban renewal on family displace-
ment raises a host of problems," 182 the court asserted that in the con-
troversy about the eviction of the Williamses, the question was the nar-
row one of whether the family in the context of the case could be de-
fined to include the Davises. The court upheld the previous determina-
tion by the district judge that the family could and should be so defined
-especially since the Williamses had always previously taken the posi-
tion in a host of other contacts with the urban renewal and allied agencies
that the Davises were part of their family. Pointing out that in fact
the Williamses would probably not have received the large apartment
rented to them in February 1966 had they not included the Davis
family as part of their household, the court said, "It is not sensible to
hold that the Williamses are now entitled to remain indefinitely in an
apartment larger than they require at a reduced rental." 188 The court
held that changes in the family group did not justify alteration of the
original terms of the lease and that therefore, the lower court properly
refused the temporary injunction since there was no reasonable prob-
ability of success at trial on the request for a permanent injunction.
Judge Hays concurred this time-but referred back to the last sentence
of his dissent in Norwalk I in which he said, "The Federal courts can-
not administer the housing program." 184 His aphoristic phrase gained
luster in the context of Norwalk II, for the plight of the Williams
family does seem like the kind of detail which could be left to the vicis-
situdes of administrative and state court action.18 On the other hand,
since the Williamses had been forced to move from an apartment where
they paid rent of only $75 a month, the controversy at least underscores
the often inequitable, indeed unjust, results of urban renewal. For no
182 410 F.2d at 535.
183 Id.
:14 Id. at 536.
185 There were deeper issues the court left unresolved, among them whether any or
all of the private defendants were obligated to assist in the relocation of tenants in a
'project area, and if they were so obligated, whether that obligation extended to
include a second relocation of a family whose situation had changed.
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matter what definition was placed on the word "family", the stark reality
remains that but for the project, the Williamses might still be paying a
$75 monthly rental. This low-income family was in effect partly paying
for an urban renewal project in which developers would reap profits
and in which, in all probability, the Williamses could not afford to live.
The narrow sort of question presented in Norwalk 11 is not likely to
be difficult for the courts to deal with in any event. The broader actions
attacking whole projects will offer far greater difficulties, particularly
in settling upon appropriate forms of relief. The problem of relief in
urban renewal controversies, as it has in school desegregation litigation,
will call for imagination and innovation on the part of the judiciary.
"While injunctive powers first come to mind as a mode of relief, the
courts are likely to be sparing in the use of their power to stop projects
altogether-especially where the project is well underway.
In Powelton Civic Home Owners Association v. HUD,8 6 a district
court halted continuation of a project still in condemnation to let a
homeowners' association gain a hearing on the adequacy of relocation
shelter.187 The order granting the preliminary injunction was entered
two months prior to the court's decision in April 1968 where it ul-
timately held (two months prior to Norwalk 1) that relocatees had
standing to "challenge the propriety of the Secretary's decisional pro-
cedures .. .and standing in the more traditional sense" because of
"substantive legal rights conferred by the National Housing Act." 18
In granting the injunctive relief, the court pointed out that it was
actually conditional, and that upon a determination that plaintiffs
had been illegally denied a procedural remedy, 89 the injunction would
186 284 F. Supp. 809 (ED. Pa. 1968).
187 The suit did not ask the court to review the substantive merit or policy of the
HUD decision to authorize funds for the project, but rather that the court determine
whether Secretary Weaver should consider the "point of view of the citizens whose
homes will be razed by the project before he decides the eligibility of the project for
federal funds." Id. at 816.
188d. at 821. The injunction preceded the decision on the merits by two months
because it "was necessary in order to protect [the courts] jurisdiction and in order
to protect the plaintiffs' claim from the threat of mootness." Id. at 814. It is interesting
to note that the injunction was not entered against the Philadelphia Redevelopment
Authority because the court was "concerned only with the legality under federal law
of the disbursement of federal funds by federal officers.' Id.
189 1d. at 838. As the equal protection clause was a major premise of Norwalk I, so
in Powelton the spectre of a denial of procedural due process weighed heavily in the
court's decision: "Particularly where, as here, the gravamen of the plaintiff's complaint
is that the Secretary has failed to provide implicitly required procedural machinery,
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only hold up disbursement of federal funds pending the grant of the
illegally denied relief. Once the hearing was held and procedural due
process afforded, the injunction would lose its force.
A comparison of Powelton and the district court opinion in Norwalk
I suggests the importance that timing may play in successful prosecution
of urban renewal cases. When the latter suit was filed, the project was
near completion, while in Powelton the project was still in its initial
stages. The relatively hostile reception that the Norwalk I plaintiffs
received 9 ' would appear to be at least partly attributable to the lateness
of their action:
If residents of a project area cannot challenge a project while it is in
the planning stages and before construction has begun, certainly they
can have no standing to assert the same kind of challenge at a time
when planning has been implemented, most of the land has been pur-
chased and conveyed to developers, and construction of new build-
ings has been almost completed. 191
Timing was clearly important in Nashville 1-40 Steering Committee
v. Ellington.192 There, plaintiffs sought to prevent state highway of-
ficials from obliterating a black business area in order to construct a sec-
tion of an interstate highway. In its denial of a preliminary injunction,
the court "regretted that appellants waited so late to begin their ef-
forts to correct the grave consequences" 193 resulting from the con-
struction. "So late" was some nine years after the initial purchases of
approximately 1,100 parcels of property and the expenditure of $10
million in acquisition and engineering costs. Though no urban renewal
program was at stake, the problems of interrupting the planning process
were acutely present, and the court relied partly on Berman, v. Parker
to affirm the refusal of the district judge "to substitute his judgment for
that of highway officials in the selection of a route for a highway." 194
Nashville 1-40 is perhaps additional evidence that injunctive relief is
likely to be granted sparingly and to achieve narrow-albeit crucial-
the court should not abandon its institutional responsibility for assuring the procedural
due process of agency actions." Id. at 822.
190 Judge Zampano described the relief sought as "almost dictatorial" and said it was
a request for "drastic judicial intervention into a large, almost fully constructed urban
renewal project." Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 42 F.R.D. 617,
621, 623 (D. Conn. 1967).
191 Id. at 622.
192 387 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 921 (1968).
-93 Id. at 186.
194 Id. at 185.
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goals. And courts will be reluctant to disrupt the planning process and
to enjoin renewal activity gone almost beyond the point of no return.
An alternative to injunctive relief is an order requiring an urban re-
newal agency to modify or supplement its plan to cure any constitutional
or statutory infirmity. Thus, rather than halt a project, a court could
shift predetermined priorities. For example, a meaningful amount of low
cost shelter might be provided rather than the token amount usually
constructed; the court might choose among differing kinds of low cost
shelter, requiring minimal architectural and engineering standards with
a view to realizing the congressional mandate for "safe, decent and
sanitary" housing. And a court might play a role in mediating the
selection of sites for different aspects of the project, for instance direct-
ing that some of the low cost housing be in favorable inner-city loca-
tions convenient to cultural and employment opportunities; it might
even require that the plan not, as most usually do, abet existing patterns
of racial separation.
The Problem of Expertise
Whatever the form of relief granted, no matter how imaginative the
judge, an exercise of judgment that disturbs the planning process will
inevitably involve the court in problems beyond its ken, or as Judge
Smith admitted in Norwalk 1, in "areas foreign to its experience and com-
petence." 195 Had Berman v. Parker not preceded the school desegrega-
tion and reapportionment cases, the problem of expertise might well be
dispositive. But since the Brown decisions'96 and their progeny,197 and
Baker v. Carr'98 and the reapportionment decisions,199 courts have
grown accustomed to managing the complex and often conflicting data
provided by the social, economic and allied sciences. The experience
has been uneven at best in achieving "deliberate speed," 20 though some-
195 395 F.2d at 930.
196 Brown v. Board of Educ, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
'97 See, e.g., United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cit.
1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (DD.C.
1967), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1968); Barlsdale v. Springfield School Comm.,
237 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass.), vacated, 348 F.2d 261 (5th Cit. 1965).
198 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
'99E.g., Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964); Conner v. Johnson, 256 F. Supp. 962 (S.D. Miss. 1966), modified, 265 F. Supp.
492, aff'd mere., 386 U.S. 483 (1967).
200 Judge Tuttle threw up his hands over the difficulties of supervising desegregation,
lamenting:
This is the fourth appearance of this case before this court. This present appeal,
1970]
Virginia Law Review
what more satisfactory in imparting meaning to the phrase "one man,
one vote." 201 This difference, however, may be instructive. The re-
apportionment cases have often turned on largely mathematical con-
siderations (more suited perhaps to sophisticated computers), while the
desegregation cases-concerned with the all-pervasive racial issue-have
involved a spectrum of disciplines such as education, psychology, social
psychology, sociology, medicine, and economics.
Urban renewal decisions are even more complex than the educational
judgments involved in instilling equality in the public schools. Many
of the "major problems . . . are within the special competence of civil
engineers, architects, transportation specialists,... land developers, build-
ers, mortgage lenders, real estate dealers, land appraisers, sociologists,
social workers, and civic leaders." 202 Moreover, even should the court
be able to command-or commandeer-the necessary expertise, the
problem of determining goals and priorities would abide.
Finally, whatever relief a court grants will in the last analysis depend
upon public acceptance and official support. Affirmative relief is par-
ticularly dependent upon the cooperation of administrators and legis-
lators. As J. Skelly Wright has said:
[T]he Court, having the power neither of the purse nor the sword,
must rely on the legislative and executive branches of government to
enforce its directives....
[TJhe Court's affirmative mandate may require the state to expend
money which the legislature is unwilling to appropriate. 203
coming as it does from an order of the trial court entered nearly eighteen
months ago, on March 31, 1965, points up, among other things, the utter im-
practicability ... for supervising the manner in which segregated school systems
break out of the policy of complete segregation into gradual steps of compliance
with the constitutional requirements of Brown v. Board of Education. . . . One
of the reasons for the impracticability of this method of overseeing the transi-
tional stages of operations of the school boards involved is that, under the
Supreme Court's "deliberate speed" provisions, it has been the duty of the ap-
pellate courts to interpret and reinterpret this language as time has grown apace,
it now being the twelfth school year since the Supreme Court's decision.
Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 364 F.2d 896, 898 (5th Cir. 1966).
201 Of the reapportionment decisions, New York University School of Law Dean
Robert B. McKay has said that although they "precipitated a revolution in the con-
cept and practice of legislative representation at every level of government, they were
implemented quickly and with surprisingly little dislocation." McKay, Reapportion-
ment: Success Story of the Warren Court, 67 MicH. L. REv. 223, 225 (1968).2 02 Foard & Fefferman, supra note 13, at 177.
203 Wright, The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democratic Society-judicial Ac-
tivism or Restraint?, 54 COREmLI L. REv. 1, 4 (1968). Judge Wright spoke from
experience. After his order in Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967),
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What Judge Wright has called the "institutional incapacity" 2 4 of the
courts certainly will continue to limit the role and effectiveness of judges
in review of urban renewal projects. The decisions are preferably left
to the legislature and agency. "All too often, however, the practical
choice has been between the Court doing the job as best it can and no
one doing it at all .... If the legislature simply cannot or does not
act to correct an unconstitutional status quo, the Court, despite all its
incapacities, must finally act to do so." 205 In the enduring words of Mr.
Justice Story:
The most delicate, and at the same time, the proudest attribute of
American jurisprudence is the right of its judicial tribunals to decide
questions of constitutional law. In other governments, these questions
cannot be entertained or decided by courts of justice; and, therefore,
whatever may be the theory of the constitution, the legislative authori-
ty is practically omnipotent, and there is no means of contesting the
legality or justice of a law, but by an appeal to arms.206
NEW CURRENTS IN URBAN RENEWAL LITIGATION
Those who make no mistakes will never make anything, and the judge
who is afraid of conmnitting himself may be called sound and safe in
his owfn generation, but will leave no mark on the laW. 20 7
Decisions since Norwalk I presage the pervasiveness of its spirit.
Judges are becoming increasingly less reluctant to question the sanctity
of urban renewal, housing and other land use schemes. Imaginative legal
challenges to programs that run afoul of constitutional and statutory
mandates promise to expand the limits of judicial participation in the
urban planning process.
A district court in San Francisco has departed from precedent in its
own circuit 2 8 to follow Norwalk's path. In the first of two opinions in
requiring transportation for volunteering students in overcrowded school districts to
underpopulated schools, Congress included in the District of Columbia appropriations
bill a provision barring the use of appropriations in the Act for "the assignment or
transportation of students to public schools in the District of Columbia in order to
overcome racial imbalance." District of Columbia Appropriations Act of 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90-495, § 16, 81 Stat. 435, 441 (1967).
204 Wright, supra note 203, at 4.
205 Id. at 6.
206 J. STOaY, MxISCLLNos WRITINGs 428 (1835).
207B. CA.i)ozo, SEtETcrFD WRITNGs 31 (M. Hall ed. 1947) (quoting Sir Frederick
Pollock).
208 The controlling precedent in the Ninth Circuit was Johnson v. Redevelopment
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a San Francisco urban renewal dispute, the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California has embraced liberal doctrines
of standing and has given displacees a forum to challenge plans of the
San Francisco Redevelopment Agency inimical to their interests. In
Western Addition Community Organization v. Weaver °9 (WACO 1),
disclaiming "presumptuously attempting to administer the complexities
of urban redevelopment," 210 the district court enjoined the Secretary
of HUD from honoring LPA requisitions for funds to continue a project
and prohibited LPA displacement of site residents by condemnation or
eviction or threats thereof. Though the second opinion, Western Ad-
dition Community Organization v. Romney2 ' (WACO 1), largely
took from the community organizations with the right hand what
WACO I had given with the left, conjointly the two decisions affirm
the propriety of judicial scrutiny of urban renewal activity.
The WACO cases emerged from controversy over the San Francisco
Redevelopment Agency's Western Addition II project. 12 Characteris-
tically, the area selected was the cultural, political and economic center
of the black community. 18 The Western Addition Community Organ-
ization, an unincorporated interracial community combine of churches,
tenants, homeowners and welfare rights committees, was the principal
plaintiff. The Community Organization objected to relocation plans that
it said were inadequate and violative of HUD and congressional man-
dates because no study had been made of the city's housing needs and
resources, and because no feasible plan had been devised for relocation,
Agency, 317 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1963). See note 95 supra and accompanying text.
Johnson was found to be distinguishable and inapplicable by the district court because
it was decided under standing concepts that predated Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83
(1968), and Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968), and because of
congressional strengthening of relocation legislation. See note 209 infra and accom-
panying text. See Note, Judicial Review of Displacee Relocation in Urban Renewal,
77 YALE L. J. 966, 983-85 (1968).
209 294 F. Supp. 433 (N.D. Cal. 1968). The New York Times quoted a lawyer
as saying the decision was "perhaps the most significant in the new national effort to
establish legal rights for the poor!' The paper also quoted an area resident as saying,
"All along we've been saying that urban renewal means nigger removal. This [the
court order] says that we know what we were talking about." N.Y. Times, Dec. 29,
1968, § 1, at 44, col. 5.
210 294 F. Supp. at 441.
211 No. 49,053 (N.D. Cal., Mar. 5, 1969).
212 The facts are partly drawn from the court's two opinions and partly from the
plaintiffs' memorandum in support of the motion for a preliminary injunction and in
opposition to the defendants' motion to dismiss.




since more families were to be displaced than the available shelter in the
San Francisco area would house. After unsuccessfully pursuing a variety
of administrative remedies for three years,21 4 application was made to
the district court to halt the project and prevent HUD from continued
support of the venture. The relocation plan was attacked as violative
of section 105(c), and the charge was made that the Secretary had
arbitrarily acquiesced in the removal scheme for site residents. Also,
plaintiffs urged that certification of the workable program had lapsed,
thereby depriving them of a forum in which to exercise free speech
rights under the first and fifth amendments.
The argument for standing in WACO I was broadly based. Plain-
tiffs relied upon the APA, Flast v. Coben,215 section 105 (c), Abbott
Laboratories 'v. Gardner,216 and Norwalk I in support of the right to
sue the federal and local defendants.217 Defendants, however, flatly
denied that there was any legal right "to obtain judicial review of an
urban renewal plan in a federal court." They also asserted that the
controversy was not "judicially cognizable," and that the adequacy of
relocation plans could only be properly assessed by HUD by reason
of its administrative expertise. Finally, the defendants asserted that they
had complied with congressional relocation strictures and accused
WACO of a "rigid attack" upon section 105(c).218
214 Redevelopment plans for the area were first presented on April 14, 1964. Con-
siderable public protest, partly spillover of resentment at the havoc created by the
predecessor project Western Addition I, failed to move the City and County Board
of Supervisors. However, HUD delayed execution of the loan and grant contract
until June 1966, following passage of California's Proposition 14, an amendment to the
California Constitution which purported to repeal the State's fair housing laws, but
was later struck down by the California Supreme Court in Reitman v. Mulkey, 64
Cal. 2d 529, 413 P.2d 825, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1966), and affirmed by the U.S. Supreme
Court, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). Had Proposition 14 been upheld, federal legislation and
regulations barring discrimination in federally assisted housing programs might have
been in conflict with, or hampered by the amendment. Proposition 14 barred state
legislation prohibiting racial discrimination in the sale or rental of housing and
"embodied in the State's basic charter, immune from legislative, executive, or judicial
regulation at any level of the state government," the right to discriminate on racial
grounds. 387 U.S. at 377.
215Plaintiffs relied on language in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-100 (1968):
[W]hen standing is placed in issue in a case, the question is whether the person
whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of a
particular issue and not whether the issue itself is justiciable.
2143 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
217 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 1. In support of this position, defendants
alternately fought a rearguard action against Norwalk I and sought to distinguish it.
218Brief for Defendants at 13. The charge of rigidity was buttressed by a plea
that urban renewal officials be given maximum flexibility in relocation planning
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The court upheld in the strongest possible terms the standing of the
plaintiffs to sue. "The test for judicial reviewability ... is not ...
whether the statute provides for it, but whether the statute precludes it.
Federal administrative action is subject to judicial review unless the
statute, itself, precludes such review." 219 Relying upon Abbott Labora-
tories v. Gardner, the court held that the APA embodied and supported
the basic presumption of the availability of judicial review to one suf-
fering from agency action. "When no other remedy for judicial review
is provided, persons suffering legal wrong because of administrative
action . . .may proceed under the Administrative Procedure Act ...
except to the extent that statutes preclude judicial review or agency
action is committed to agency discretion by law." 220 The court also
reasoned that since under Flast a taxpayer had standing, those not "de-
pendent on mere taxpayer status" certainly had standing to sue for
enforcement of a statute designed by Congress to protect that person's
interest. In support of this position, Norwalk 1 and Powelton Civic
Home Owners were coupled with Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities.221
The substantive issues in the case-the adequacy of the relocation plan
and the certification of the workable program-were structured by the
court in the narrowest possible terms. Having taken judicial cognizance
of the controversy, the court then skirted its edges. It tersely disposed
of the workable program problem with a statement that "no material
issue" was tendered by the allegations concerning the program. Rather
than determining expiration as occurring on June 30, 1967, as plaintiffs
charged, the court adopted the defendant's position, which was predi-
cated on a proviso in the program's original certification that the work-
able program remained in force for projects in which a loan and grant
were executed prior to the expiration date of the workable program.222
The major part of the opinion turned on a discussion of the relocation
because of the exceedingly fluid nature of the process. Because of voluntary removal
by site residents, the defendants argued there was never any way to kmow exactly
how many persons would require relocation, and reaching histrionic heights, the brief
declared:
There are people who live in the project area who may not move until 1975.
How can . . . this court or any plaintiff or the Secretary of HUD know now
whether or not the relocation plan of the local agency is going to be able to
relocate someone who moves out of the project area in 1975? San Francisco
might not even be here in 1975.
Id.
219 294 F. Supp. at 442.
20Id.
22 1 See id. at 443, citing Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968).
2 22 See 294 F. Supp. at 445.
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program. Rather than examining the sufficiency of the relocation pro-
gram per se, the court decided that the issue really was whether HUD
had been given "satisfactory assurance" of the adequacy of relocation
plans. Because of a 1965 amendment to the urban renewal statutes223
which "was adopted to make doubly sure that the Secretary would
police the local agency's performance of its contractual relocation ob-
ligations," 224 and because there was no express statutory provision re-
quiring HUD to approve relocation plans, the court refined the case
to the question whether HUD had complied with the statute and its own
regulations. The court thus avoided the necessity of making an inde-
pendent judgment about the adequacy of the relocation plan. Under
its view of the case, it had only to determine that the statute had been
complied with-not as to relocation but as to assurances about the ade-
quacy of relocation. By using this approach, the case could be decided
without infringing on the agency's discretion and expertise.
Conceding that considerable discretion was vested in the Secretary,
the WACO I court ruled that this discretion was not so totally com-
mitted to agency action as to preclude judicial review of its arbitrary
abuse. However, the court limited its own function to deciding whether
the discretion concerning the satisfactoriness of the relocation plan
rested upon some substantial and supporting factual basis. After order-
ing defendants to file the complete and voluminous administrative record,
it was discovered that the HUD Secretary had never found the reloca-
tion plan for the project to be satisfactory, but had nevertheless dis-
bursed funds under the loan and grant contract.225 The court refused
to accept the defendants' position that approval with a number of con-
223 42 U.S.C. S 1455 (c) (2) (Supp. IV, 1969).
224 294 F. Supp. at 436. "Further, entirely apart from subsection (c) (2), defendants'
own regulations, enacted pursuant to subsection (c) (1), e.g., Urban Renewal Manual,
Sec. 10-1.... [provide] that the local agency must 'assure' the Secretary concerning the
relocation situation." Id. at 437.
225 Id. at 439-40.
Upon this record the court can well understand why the Secretary refrained for
a year from making any official determination, one way or the other, con-
cerning the satisfactoriness of the local relocation plan. It was just not satisfactory.
When pressed by this court's order of June 26, 1968 for production of evidence
that the law was being complied with, all that the Secretary could then honestly
do was to make a belated determination of 'satisfactoriness' with one hand and
then take it back with the other by making that determination entirely contin-
gent on future events and accomplishments. Without these contingencies, a
determination of satisfactoriness just could not have been reasonably made
because the evidence before the Secretary was all to the contrary.
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ditions and contingencies was satisfactory approval within the requisites
of section 105(c) and the pertinent HUD regulations.
If plaintiffs' strategy was to use the relocation issue to force an aban-
donment or major revision of the project, they were not successful. The
court refused to invalidate previous payments or unconditionally to
restrain future financing of the project. Relief was narrowed to pro-
hibiting eviction and condemnation by the LPA and halting HUD from
honoring fund requisitions until the HUD Secretary could show that
the relocation plan was satisfactory to him. The court also required
that its approval be obtained, but apparently intended that satisfactory
to the Secretary was satisfactory to the court, or so WACO I seems to
hold.
Before WACO I had appeared in the advance sheets, the preliminary
injunction was dissolved in WACO 11226 and the project was permitted
to proceed apace-on the assurance that relocation was satisfactory to
HUD, although plaintiffs offered evidence that it was still grossly in-
adequate.227 The narrow range of judicial review in WACO I was re-
emphasized in the WACO II decision:
Since the statute vests the function and responsibility squarely upon
the Secretary, the judicial function is narrowly limited to ascertaining
whether the Secretary has made the determination required of him by
law and, if so, whether he has acted in apparent good faith, reasonably
rather than arbitrarily and with some factual basis for his decision. If
so, judicial review can go no further. The Court may not, and should
not, substitute its judgment for that of the Secretary-even if the court
might believe that the Secretary could have made a different decision
concerning the satisfactoriness of the local agency's relocation plan
and assurances.228
226 WACO I was filed December 16, 1968, and appeared in the West advance sheets
dated March 17, 1969. The opinion in WACO I was filed March 5, 1969.
227The evidence that the plaintiffs introduced was noted by the court, but it was
not found to be dispositive. As the court observed:
This evidence, however, merely indicates that the record is such as to be
subject to different inferences and is, therefore, controversial. The Secretary has
drawn one inference while the plaintiffs argue to the contrary.
No. 49,053 at 7.
2 28 1d. at 8-9. This language was very similar to that of the court in WACO 1:
We conclude, therefore, that the Secretary's action now under consideration is
subject to judicial review-at least to the extent of determining whether the
Secretary's discretion concerning the satisfactoriness of the relocation plan has
been exercised not arbitrarily but reasonably upon some substantial and supporting
factual basis.
294 F. Supp. 433, 443 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
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Whatever its intent and purposes, WACO's lawsuit was principally a
delaying action, since WACO I placed site residents squarely back
within the discretionary power of the LPA and HUD. The court had
simply sought to insure that the appropriate agencies complied with
procedural requirements for satisfactory assurance of adequate reloca-
tion facilities. Since "satisfactory assurance" had to be subjectively de-
termined, the court only looked for a reasonable agreement with ap-
pearances. 229 Thus, the actual finding of what was adequate remained
in the hands of the agencies; upon LPA assurance that the relocation
facilities were adequate and a non-arbitrary determination by HUD
of the satisfactoriness of the assurances, judicial inquiry ended.
It is clear that the initial intervention of the court and its clear-cut
grant of standing caused the local and federal officials to be more
malleable, more amenable to the influence and more sensitive to the
needs of site residents. This effect was similar to the result of Norwalk
I, where CORE's status and function as a power broker for the city's
blacks was significantly enhanced by the litigation.2 0 An appeal from
Judge Sweigert's WACO Il order was filed and then later voluntarily
dismissed following an agreement between site residents and the LPA
creating a citizens' advisory committee with a salaried staff and a $100,-
000 budget.2 1 The suit remains on Judge Sweigert's call and presumably
can be activated on motion. Given the limitations-self-imposed or actual
-of the judiciary in reviewing large scale urban renewal projects, even
the indirect check on urban renewal projects of potential judicial inter-
vention may be regarded as significant.
Two days after the WACO II decision undercut the force of WACO
I, federal district Judge Keith in Garret v. Hamtramck 3 preliminarily
enjoined the city of Hamtramck, Michigan, from selling or redeveloping
property acquired in an urban renewal project until it complied with
relocation provisions of a loan and grant contract. Black residents of
the Wyandotte Area Renewal Project had filed the suit to stop the city,
an inner-city suburb of Detroit, from acquiring and demolishing sub-
standard and low-cost housing. Unlike any of the other relocation con-
troversies, none of the plaintiffs lived in the area undergoing renewal,
although some did reside in an adjacent area scheduled for redevelop-
229 See No. 49,053 at 8.
230 Interview with Stephen L. Fine, supra note 173.
2 3 1 Interview with Michael Davidson of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, Inc., one of the attorneys for WACO, in New York City, June 20, 1969.
232 No. 32,004 (ED. Mich., Mar. 7, 1969).
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ment next. Plaintiffs alleged that all of the city's urban renewal activi-
ties were designed to "remove Negroes" and that absent court action
contracts would be entered into for construction of housing that blacks
could not afford, assuring the permanency of their removal. Therefore,
plaintiffs sought to have the city include in its renewal plan adequate
relocation shelter within the means of potential displacees as required
by statute and HUD regulation.
Although HUD had approved the project, the court deemed the
evidence unclear whether the agency was completely satisfied with re-
location plans.238 However, relying upon a private study commissioned
by the city which called for the" [a] doption of new relocation procedures
to meet both the letter and spirit of the law," 234 the court found that
HUD relocation procedures had not been followed and that defendants
had failed to show the existence of adequate low-cost relocation facili-
ties. The court refused to stop acquisition and condemnation, but did
impede project activity by barring the resale and redevelopment of
cleared land in the only area available for housing pending provision of
low-cost relocation shelter.
Thus, the court delayed but did not halt the project; it effected a
compromise that left the parties substantial room to settle the dispute
out of court. The opinion appeared designed to prod, rather than
coerce, the city into satisfactory relocation planning; it suggested that
the city "may find that the only way to comply with the loan and grant
contract is to make available low-cost housing or rental units within the
Wyandotte Area, but the Court is in no position at this state of the
proceedings to order that to be done." 235
If dramatic intervention by the federal judiciary in the planning
process comes at all, it is more likely to occur in situations involving
some form of racial discrimination with its attendant constitutional is-
sues. Such is the lesson of two recent district court decisions-Ranjel
233 To say the least, HUD was ambiguous about the satisfactoriness of the relocation
plans. As early as April 1967 (part II of the loan and grant application was approved
October 1, 1968), plaintiffs sent a 22-page letter to the HUD regional office detailing
objections to the provisions for relocating the displacees. In April 1968 a letter was
sent to Secretary Weaver requesting an investigation of the project. What action HUD
took about the letter to Weaver was never revealed to the court, although the earlier
letter "did result in some type of investigation by the Department of Housing and
Urban Development, but the findings of that investigation have not been made
available." Id. at 6.




v. City of Lansing36 and Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority.23 7
Although Ranjel was subsequently reversed by the Sixth Circuit,238
the lower court's opiniori may be representative of future judicial atti-
tudes toward racial issues in urban renewal controversies. It is, at the
least, an interesting study in the problems likely to be encountered in
future cases. The district court in Ranjel permanently enjoined the
city from holding a referendum that would have repealed a zoning
change that permitted the development of a low rent and interracial
housing complex in an exclusively white section of the city. In an un-
published order, the court also granted affirmative relief by ordering
city officials to process the plans previously submitted for construction
of the disputed housing. The site was selected by city and federal
officials to alleviate an emerging crisis in minority group housing ac-
commodations and to comply with the HUD policy that site selections
be made outside areas of racial concentration. 39 The genius-and to
some the consequent vice-of the plan was that its execution would have
in one blow significantly integrated Lansing housing and schools.
The court found that the resistance to the originally selected site, the
motivation behind the circulation of the referendum petitions, and the
attempts to hold the referendum for denying the original variance, were
"in major part based on economic and racial discrimination in hous-
ing.2140 The court pursued two theories in invalidating the proposed
referendum.24 1 First, frustration of the project would have deprived
plaintiffs of rights and benefits conferred on them by an act of Congress
= 293 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. Mich.), rev'd 417 F.2d 321 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 980 (1970).
237 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ili. 1969).
2-38 417 F.2d 321 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 980 (1970). See notes 245-47
infra and accompanying text. In seeking certiorari in the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs
argued that the Sixth Circuit opinion conflicted with the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. Union City, 424 F.2d 291 (9th
Cir. 1970).239 District court Judge Fox's opinion held that federal policy against racial discrimi-
nation, as evidenced by the thirteenth amendment of the Constitution, provisions of the
Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1982, 2000(d) (1964), and the
Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601-19, 31 (Supp. IV, 1969), barred passage of
the referendum. However, the only reference to a specific policy of relocation of
displaced persons outside areas of racial concentration was found in HUD, Low RENr
HousINa MANuAL § 205.1, 1 4g, which does not have the weight of a federal regulation.
293 F. Supp. at 309.240 Id. at 307.
241 There are "two basic and independent points on which this decision stands:
federal pre-emption and municipal furtherance of discrimination." Id. at 312.
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implementing the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments and seriously
impeded federal policy to remove the badges of slavery by erasing the
effects of racial discrimination. 242 Thus, the supremacy clause of the
United States Constitution243 forbade local efforts to overide a national
strategy designed to insure full citizenship for blacks. Second, the city's
collaboration with the whites who initiated the referendum would in-
volve it in private discrimination prohibited under the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution.2 44
The Sixth Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, reversed the district court
on the grounds that there was no identifiable conflict between state and
federal law245 and that the finding of racial discrimination underlying
the referendum was not supported.246 Moreover, the finding of state
action in conducting the referendum was held to be improper since
"neutral principles" exempted this governmental process from restraints
by the federal courts.247
Reasoning analogous to the original Ranjel decision was followed by
District Judge Richard Austin in Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing
Authority.28 There he granted summary judgment to black public
housing tenants and applicants who complained that the city's housing
authority had selected project sites and adopted tenant assignment pro-
cedures for the purpose of maintaining Chicago's existing patterns of
residential separation of the races.249 The Chicago Housing Authority
justified its segregationist policy as a way of avoiding tension and
violence between blacks and whites in public housing. Through an
elaborate and rather byzantine scheme devised by the City Council and
242 id. at 308-09. See note 239 supra.
243 U.S. CoNsr. art. VI, § 2.
2 44 The court relied heavily upon Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 US. 369 (1967), in finding
that the referendum involved state action. 293 F. Supp. at 311-12.
245 417 F.2d at 323. The court based this finding on its inability to find direct
language requiring relocation outside of areas of racial concentration in any of the
statutory authority relied upon by the district court.
24 417 F.2d at 323-24. A finding of racial motivation in seeking the referendum could
only have been accomplished by searching the minds of the electorate. The district
court's reliance on opinion evidence to support its finding of discriminatory purpose
was found to be improper. Id. at 324.247 d. This reference to "neutral principles" was based upon the concurring opinion
of Justice Harlan in Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 395 (1969).
248 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
249 The court had found standing to sue in an earlier opinion. Gautreaux v. Chicago
Housing Authority, 265 F. Supp. 582 (ND. IM. 1967). Civil rights legislation was
found to uphold the right of plaintiffs to challenge racially motivated site selection.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 2000d (1964).
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CHA, the city maintained four segregated white projects; the balance
of its public housing was 99 percent black in occupancy, and 99.5 per-
cent of the units were located in areas that were (or soon would be)
substantially all black.25 ° Refusing to enjoin the expenditure of federal
funds for public housing in Chicago, the court directed the parties to
formulate site and tenant selection policies together.2 51 The order sub-
sequently adopted by the court has broad implications for the future
of city planning in Chicago, given the all-pervasive racial segregation
in its housing,252 and may be a rather startling step in the evolution of
judicial review in urban renewal controversies.
While it is beyond the scope of this study to consider all of the rami-
fications of the order, the detail and breadth of its language indicate how
critically judicial review can affect the planning process-in this case
the provision of low-cost shelter. The order applies to all CHA housing
projects; it establishes an immediate quota of 700 new housing units in
the hitherto "white preserves" 253 and placement of 75 percent of all
future housing in those areas; it limits the number of occupants of any
dwelling unit to 120 persons (except that in exceptional circumstances
the maximum may be 240 persons) 2 4 and formulates new tenant selec-
tion and assignment policies; 2 5 and it forbids assignment of families with
children to apartments above the third floor of any dwelling unit.256
The various limitations and directives contained in the order regarding
planning decisions based on race probably were necessary to satisfy
statutory and constitutional requirements against racial discrimination.
However, the lack of flexibility left to the planning apparatus
regarding racial considerations could have adverse side effects. The
already tenuous political support for public housing may wither as the
250 The history of apartheid in Chicago's public housing has been ably told in
M. MYERSON & E. BANFILD, Pouaxcs, PLANNING AND THE PUBLIC INTERmsr (1955).
251 296 F. Supp. at 914.
252 304 F. Supp. 736 (ND. Il. 1969).
253 Id. at 738. The court labeled all the areas of nonwhite racial concentration
"Limited Public Housing Area." All the remaining area of Cook County was named
the "General Public Housing Area." Id. at 737. It was in this latter area that the
next 700 units and 75% of all future housing had to be located. Id. at 738-39.
2M Id. at 739.
255 Id. at 742-43.
2561d. at 739. A recurrent hazard of project dwellers is the death and serious
injury of young children falling from balconies. Chicago has the world's largest
housing project under one management-the Robert Taylor Homes-which is com-
posed of 28 high rise buildings, each 16 stories high. A variety of social problems
have been abetted and sometimes caused by the height of the buildings. See McGee,
Juvevile Justice and the Ghetto Law Office, 60 U. Cm. MAGAZINE 12 (1967).
19701
Virginia Law Review
spectre of subsidized desegregation becomes manifest to white com-
munities indifferent or mildly hostile to public housing, but implacably
opposed to the racial mixing of their own neighborhoods. In a telegram
to HUD Secretary George Romney after the Gautreaux decision, the
National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing declared that
"we must face the fact that local housing authorities and suburban com-
munities, which heretofore have been reluctant to introduce public
housing, may now use this ruling to reject all further low-income housing
proposals, and instead continue their emphasis on middle-income hous-
ing developments, water and sewer grants, highway programs, and other
federal aids and grants." 257
Compounding the political problem of race, the order also strikes
another public nerve-that of the cost of public housing. The court
has effectively limited the size and height of project buildings that the
CHA may plan to erect. Thus, the CHA will be forced to recast com-
pletely its existing design commitment to mammoth, multi-storied
structures. Smaller structures in large projects will inevitably require
acquisition and clearance of larger tracts should the Authority persist
in its open-space bias. Moreover, these may not be as cheap to construct
and maintain as the existing tiered cells which loom above Chicago's
ghettos. Dispersing smaller, compact units throughout the city could
also require an increase in CHA expenditures. "Vest-pocket public
housing makes good architectural news; it also tends to be slow in pro-
duction, expensive, very difficult to secure sites for, and substantially
nonexistent." 258
Although "HUD has decided not to appeal Judge Austin's ruling,
thereby limiting its effect to Chicago," 259 the principle established in
Gautreaux, that those eligible for public housing may obtain relief for
discriminatory site-selection, was followed elsewhere in a different so-
cial and planning context. In Hicks v. Weaver,210 a Louisiana district
judge expressly relied on Gautreaux"' and enjoined the Bogalusa Hous-
ing Authority, an LPA in a small town 3 5 miles north of New Orleans,
from constructing public housing units in racially segregated black
2 57The telegram appears in Craig, A Housing Desegregation Ruling in Chicago is
Having Reverberations on a National Scale, CITY CHRONiCLE (Moirrmy REPORT OF
URBAN AmERCA), July 1969, at 4.
2 58 Sternlieb, New York's Housing: A Study in Innobilisnze, Tim PUBLIC INTERET
123, 133 (No. 16, Summer 1969).
259 Craig, supra note 257, at 4.
260 302 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. La. 1969).
261 Id. at 621, 623.
[Vol. 56:826
Urban Rene'al
communities within Bogalusa. Unlike Gautreaux, the Hicks court also
enjoined the Secretary of HUD from making any further payment of
federal funds to the LPA. The court found HUD to have been an
"active participant [in discrimination against the plaintiffs] since it
could have halted the discrimination at any step in the program." 262
It is noteworthy that the Hicks court looked to the standards that HUD
itself had established in finding discrimination in site selection. 263
The WACO, Garrett, Ran jel and Gautreaux decisions indicate the
range and depth of recent judicial contact with urban renewal and
allied land use schemes. Increasingly, litigants are pressing courts to
resolve disputes that emerge in the wake of the implementation of urban
renewal plans. Lawyers with the NAACP Legal Defense and Educa-
tional Fund, Inc., architects of much of the school desegregation liti-
gation, are participating in important cases throughout the country
that involve the fate of housing, urban renewal and highway projects.
The far-reaching nature of the relief sought in many of the cases will
require courts to consider a variety of issues which, until recently,
might have been held beyond their grasp.
Routing of the New York Hudson River Expressway and related
access routes has been challenged in Finn v. Rockefeller'" by minority
group citizens of Ossining and North Tarrytown, New York. They
followed two villages and two conservation groups which had already
filed actions to enjoin construction of the road that threatened to dis-
place over 4,100 households.2 65 As in Norvalk, the blacks and Puerto
262 Id. at 623. The American Civil Liberties Union has filed a separate lawsuit against
HUD, in sequel to Gautreaux, seeking a ruling that HUD, through its funding of
CHA projects, participated in the LPA's racially discriminatory site selection practices.
The ACLU's lawyer, Alexander Polikoff, who was the principal lawyer for the plain-
tiffs in Gautreaux, said that if "Judge Austin agrees on the liability of HUD,.... we
can ask for an order making more realistic the relief we are seeking through utilizing
a broader scope of programs" going beyond public housing to other forms of federal
subsidies aimed at low-income families. See Craig, supra note 257.
26 302 F. Supp. at 622. The court relied in large part on a policy articulated by
HUD that "forbids the construction of federally-financed public housing in all-Negro
neighborhoods in the absence of a clear showing that no other acceptable sites are
available." Id.
2 64 No. 69 Civ. 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). The Pinn action has not been pressed by either
side pending the disposition of the concurrent conservationists' suit. See note 265 infra.
20 5 In the original actions brought by the conservationists, the district court blocked
the plan for the road by enjoining the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers from issuing
a permit to the State of New York to dredge and fill in the river for the proposed
construction. The court also enjoined the New York Department of Transportation
from further construction without the approval of the Secretary of the U.S. Depart-
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Ricans in Pinn assert that state action in building the highway has bjeen
undertaken without consideration of the disproportionate impact on
displaced citizens subject to rampant discrimination in the housing
market,. Equal protection arguments have been raised in an effort to
force abandonment of the route that will either exile blacks from Os-
sining and North Tarrytown or force them into substandard dwellings
because of alleged lack of relocation shelter. The normally esoteric
engineering problems involved in the planning of a major expressway
have been further complicated by navigational and conservation prob-
lems, because much of the route follows the eastern shore of the Hudson
with consequential impact on recreational and historical areas. Aside
from its aesthetic effect on the river and shoreline, the charge has been
made in the conservationists' suit-consolidated with Pinn-that filling
in parts of the river will 'destroy the habitat of vast numbers of fish and
other aquatic life. The court's task is not simplified by consideration of
the growing crisis in traffic congestion in the area to be served by the
expressway 266 and the increased cost of delay, factors which were per-
suasive to the judge who denied the conservationists' application for a
preliminary injunction. Even more difficult, however, are the critical
problems of displacement developed in excruciating detail in the affidavit
of city planner Yale Rabin (filed in opposition to defendants' motion
to dismiss) which concludes:
ment of Transportation or without obtaining express congressional consent. Citizens
Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 302 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). The
court reserved decision on issues raised in the consolidated suit of the minority groups
until disposition of the appeal of its action in the conservationists' lawsuits.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe,
No. 34010 (2d Cir, April 16, 1970), holding that although the statute under which
the Axmy Chief of Engineers issued the disputed permit contained no provision for
judicial review, "[tIhe district court properly relied on the presumption of review-
ability embodied in the Administrative Procedure Act where there was no evidence
of a congressional intent to prohibit review." The court said that through the
APA Congress intended to assure comprehensive review of a "broad spectrum" of
administrative actions, including those made reviewable by specific statutes without
adequate review provisions as well as those for which no review is available under
any other statute. Although the conservationists did not claim that the proposed
expressway threatened any direct personal or economic harm to them, the court
determined that they had standing as "private Attorneys General" to protect the public
interest "in the natural resources, scenic beauty and historical value of the area." Id. at
2343. ,
206:The expressway is planned to extend for approximately nine miles along the east
shore of the Hudson River from a point near the Tappan Zee bridge at Tarrytown
north to Grotonville. Some 22,000 feet of the road will rest on fill extending at the
widest point 1,300 feet into the river.
[Vol. 56:826
Urban Renewal
For many Black and Puerto Rican families life in their present sur-
roundings represents a hard won alternative to the tense and oppressive
conditions of the city ghetto. To deprive these households of the con-
tinued opportunity to live in the communities of their choice is to
expose the insensitive disregard for human needs which has character-
ized the planning of this expressway, and provide evidence in support
of the Kerner Report findings that, "White racism is essentially re-
sponsible for the explosive mixture which has been accumulating in
our cities since the end of World War II." 267
English v. Town of Huntington,2 68 another suit in which plaintiffs
are represented by the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund
lawyers, involves a challenge to the adequacy of relocation plans in an
urban renewal project. The court has been asked to enjoin local officials
from taking action that will result in displacement and to stop federal
officials from granting funds or otherwise approving financing until
adequate relocation shelter is assured. The court has also been asked to
void the town's building ordinance that discourages multiple dwellings
and low-cost single family residences. Additionally, affirmative relief
has been requested to require local urban renewal officials to modify
the plan so that low-rent public housing would be constructed on cer-
tain designated tracts. The court thus has been asked not only to
void and/or enjoin project activity harmful to plaintiffs but also to
reshape the plan itself to afford relief.
Affirmative relief has also been sought in Kennedy Park Homes As-
sociation, Inc. v. City of Lackawanna.2 69 The suit seeks to force of-
ficials of the industrial community near Buffalo, New York, to approve
a subdivision scheme and issue building permits, variances and certifi-
cates of occupancy for the development of a low-income housing com-
plex located outside of the black ghetto. The action also requests that
the court invalidate zoning ordinance amendments passed pursuant to
resolutions adopted by the Lackawanna City Council three days after
the FHA declared the low-income housing subdivision feasible. The
zoning action, which restricted the lands intended for the project to
park and recreational use, was reminiscent of the action taken in Deer-
field, Illinois, described in Progress Development Corp. v. MitchelY.270
207 Affidavit of Yale Rubin in Behalf of Plaintiffs at 16, Pinn v. Rockefeller, No. 69
Civ. 420 (SD.N.Y. 1969).26 No. 69 Civ. 144 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
2
m No. 1968-385 (W.D.N.Y. 1968).
270 286 F.2d 222 (7th Cir. 1961). In this case, land intended for interracial redidency
1970]
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The resolutions also declared an indefinite moratorium on all subdivision
construction in the city. Plaintiffs have invoked the thirteenth amend-
ment and the equal protection and supremacy clauses to protect their
rights to develop low-cost housing pursuant to federal statutes, including
the Fair Housing Act of 1968271 and the United States Housing Act of
1937.272 In contrast to many of the actions in which HUD or other fed-
eral officials have been defendants, the Government has intervened as
plaintiff, though only to seek injunctive relief against giving effect to
the rezoning.
That there is the quality of d6ji vu273 to much of the litigation is il-
lustrated by Harris v. Charlottesville Redevelopment and Housing
Authority,274 a suit that recalls Gautreaux. The action seeks to enjoin
the Virginia city's LPA from constructing low-rent public housing on
three sites in close proximity to each other, near existing public housing,
and either within or on the edge of the black residential neighborhood.
Plaintiffs have charged that construction of the some 400 housing units
will perpetuate and concentrate the city's ghetto. As evidence that site
selection was racially motivated, plaintiffs allege that a location near
a white residential area outside the black ghetto was rejected after its
initial selection by the agency following receipt of a petition signed by
2,538 citizens opposing location of the housing outside the ghetto but
supporting public housing within it. No affirmative relief is requested;
in fact, the plaintiffs ask that the agency be enjoined from condemnation
proceedings until the disestablishment of the prevailing custom and
practice of residential segregation in the city, and until adequate relo-
cation facilities are provided for site residents.
The suit is further complicated by an attack upon codefendant
Charlottesville School Board's location of an elementary school in
the vicinity of either of the public housing project sites. The overall
thrust of the suit, however, is to prevent the defendants from locating
the public housing and the school so as to shape the pattern of growth
had been condemned for use as a park. See note 114 supra and accompanying text.
See Deerfield Park Dist. v. Progress Dev. Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 132, 174 N.E.2d 850 (1961),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 968 (1963).
27142 U.S.C. §S 3601-31 (Supp. IV, 1969).
27242 U.S.C. §§ 1401-36 (1964).
273 As sociologist Kenneth B. Clark said in testimony before the Kerner Commission,
"I must again in candor say to you members of this Commission-it is a kind of Alice
in Wonderland with the same moving picture reshown over and over again, the same
analysis, the same recommendations, and the same inaction." REPORT oF T-E NTmAL
ADvisORY ComMISSioN oN CiviL Disoanaas 265 (1968).
2 7 4 No. 68-C.25-C (W.D. Va. 1968).
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in the city along racial lines. The suit posits both a constitutional and
a statutory duty of the defendants to take affirmative steps to eradicate
segregated housing and educational practices.2" 5
The creativity of the new litigation is best exemplified by an appeal
from a district court dismissal of an action to enjoin a private developer
from undertaking the renewal of part of a black ghetto even though no
federal funds were involved. In Arrington v. City of Fairfield276 the
Fifth Circuit was asked to reverse a district court's dismissal of a suit
brought to halt displacement of black tenants by commercial develop-
ment and construction of a motel in an area that had been proposed for
an urban renewal project using federal funds. The suit alleged that the
development scheme in which the city participated, and the consequen-
tial exclusion of the displacees from the city, denied blacks the right
to hold and lease property in the city in violation of the due process
and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
Many of the factors common to urban renewal controversies con-
sidered earlier in this Article appeared in Arrington, except for the all-
important and otherwise constant element of federal funding. The con-
troversial site was in a black ghetto. Application was made to HUD
for an urban renewal grant, but the request was denied because of HUD
objection to the lack of public or private resources in the city sufficient
to house persons who would have been displaced. The only housing
planned for displaced low income black families was in Dolomite, Ala-
bama, an unincorporated, predominantly black community five miles
from the city, which did not meet the HUD requirement that relocation
be within the city.
While the application to HUD was still pending, the city council
(apparently deciding to proceed without federal funds) authorized the
mayor to enter into a contract with Engel Realty Company, one of the
defendants, for the commercial development of the area. For its part
275 Cf. United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966),
aff'd on rehearing, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967); 24
C.F.R. § 1.4(b) (2) (i) (1970); HUD Low-Rmrr HousING MANUAL S 205.1, 4g which
reads in part:
The aim of a Local Authority in carrying out its responsibility for site selection
should be to select from among sites which are acceptable under the other criteria
of this Section those which will afford the greatest opportunity for inclusion
of eligible applicants of all groups regardless of race, color, creed, or national
minority groups an opportunity to locate outside of areas of concentration
of their own minority groups. Any proposal to locate housing only in areas of
racial concentration will be prima facie unacceptable.
270 414 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1969).
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the city would install drainage pipe. HUD subsequently rejected the
urban renewal application upon finding that the displacement caused
by development of the area would exile many blacks from Fairfield.
The lawsuit and subsequent appeal charged the city with doing in-
directly what it could not have done directly-drive blacks from the
city into substandard housing facilities. Plaintiffs suggested that HUD
relocation procedures be used as minimum standards to govern the ap-
plication of the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments in both federally
aided and non-federally aided urban development and housing pro-
grams 7 The core of plaintiffs' theory was that the city's agreement
to participate by laying the drainage pipe, thereby making possible the
motel construction and commercial development, constituted constitu-
tionally prohibited state action when coupled with the presence of per-
vasive racial discrimination and the consequent shortage of relocation
housing for blacks in the community.
The defendants and the lower court took the relatively simplistic
position that the drainage pipe benefited everyone in the area equally,.
that the agreement to build the motel was strictly between the owners
of the property and the developers, and that the city was not partici-
pating in a federal urban renewal program. Thus, it was not bound by.
the strictures of federal statutes and regulations.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court, al-
though the dissenting judge warned that "the effect of their decision is
to convert the federal courts into local drainage ditch supervisors." 278
In the majority's view, the district judge mainly erred by embracing a
discredited rationale of standing and "never reached the merits of the
claim because [he] concluded that the 'plaintiffs having no interest in
the property or interest in the contracts [for commercial development
of the disputed area] . . . have no right to invoke the jurisdiction of
this Court.' " 279 Although the plaintiffs were tenants rather than land-
owners, the court avoided the objections that defendants raised on
this point by noting that "[t] he crux of I plaintiffs'] claim is not dep-
rivation of property without due pocess . . . but violation of equal
277 Id. at 693. Although the court declined to "cross this threshold of constitutional
law," it might have found precedent for such a use of federal guidelines in United
States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966), ^aff'd on rehearing,
380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
278 414 F.2.d at 694. The dissent.was by Circuit Judge James P. Coleman, who was
once Governor of Mississippi.
29 Id. at 691.
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protection." 280 Thus, a fee interest is not a prerequisite to the vindica-
tion of constitutional rights in this context.
In a lucid, uncomplicated view of standing, the court declared that
"plaintiffs' stake in the outcome of the case is immediate and personal
and they stand to suffer economic injury if they lose." 281 Norwalk I
was expressly endorsed, Flast v. Cohen followed, and Johnson v. Re-
development Agency 2s2 was found "not apposite" and described as
"rejected in subsequent decisions." 283 The "personal stake" of the
plaintiffs coupled with the alleged violation of a constitutionally pro-
tected right (the right not to be subjected to racial discrimination by
state action) was sufficient to confer standing.
Thus, equal protection was the other theory upon which the court
predicated its reversal. As had the lower court, dissenting Judge Cole-
man said the case presented no federal question and "offers the slimmest
support I have ever seen for federal intervention in a purely local matter
(at the Board of Alderman level)." 284 The majority thought other-
wise, however, and held that the district court shut off inquiry pre-
maturely by granting summary judgment. "[P]laintiffs may be able
to show that the City will knowingly and actively precipitate the dis-
location of persons who, because of a city-wide practice of residential
discrimination, will have no place to go .... Where there is state in-
volvement, the fact that the decision to discriminate may be made by [a]
private individual rather than a public official is not decisive." 288 There
being "little doubt" on the part of the majority that state action was
present, the trial court was commanded to determine its constitutionality.
Despite plaintiffs' clearcut victory, it should be noted that the court's
view was more restricted than the one contended for by the plaintiffs,
who called for the imposition of federal statutory and HUD regulatory
schemes as minimum standards for urban development projects, whether
federally financed or not. By arguing for the federal standards, the
plaintiffs selected legal terrain more suitable to the defendants. In the
2S9 Id.
281 Id.
282317 F.2d 872 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 915 (1963). See text at notes 95-102
supra.
2.3 414 F.2d at 691-92. The court supported this conclusion with Norwalk I, IVA CO 1,
and Powelton Civic Honie Owners. Cited also-as evidence of broadening concepts
of standing-was Nashville 1-40 Steering Comm. v. Ellington, 387 F.2d 179 (6th Cit.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 921 (1968).
2s4 414 F.2d at 696.
25 Id. at 692.
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total absence of federal participation, it was unlikely (as the opinion
confirmed) that the court would apply the requirements of federal
urban renewal law. Plaintiffs' approach only highlighted the lack of
federal and perhaps state government participation. The court's en-
dorsement of an expansive view of equal protection and a simplified
approach to standing was a more manageable approach to plaintiffs'
case.
The entire controversy demonstrates some of the basic dilemmas and
limits of judicial review. While in the usual action, the presence of
federal funds and activity will render inapplicable the vexing and
anomalous facts of Fairfield, the case illustrates how vitally important
economic and political factors are in the planning process. Both the
classic legal impotency of tenants and the political powerlessness of
blacks emerge in the decision, with especially important consequences
in the absence of a legislative scheme for their protection. A city ad-
ministration sensitive to the needs of the 161 families, nearly all poor
and black, would not have permitted the site development without
making adjustments for the plight of the displacees and obtaining ap-
propriate concessions from those who stood to profit from the con-
struction of the motel and other commercial facilities. Indeed, with
sufficient political power, the site residents might have compelled the
city to consummate an agreement with HUD providing for low-cost
housing instead of, or in addition to, the commercial venture. Even
the exceptionally capable and imaginative lawyers who have chal-
lenged the city's action in this case did not seek this ultimate of reme-
dies. Thus, even if the courts eventually stop the project and prohibit
development of the motel, the blacks will still be living in progressively
deteriorating housing and will remain, in the understatement of plain-
tiffs' brief, "impoverished."
CONCLUSION
Justice will be universal in this country when the processes as well
as the doors of the courthouse are open to everyone. This can occur
only as the institutions of justice, the courts and their processes are
kept responsive to the needs of justice in the modern world. Such a
goal will be accomplished only as all elements of the legal system, the
lawmakers, practicing attorneys, legal scholars and judges, recognize
the very changing effects of the law on society and adapt them within
the principles which are fundamental to freedom.286
M6 Address by Mr. Chief Justice Earl Warren, cornerstone-laying ceremonies of the
Roscoe Pound American Trial Lawyers Law Center, Sept. 28, 1968.
Urban Renewal
Ever-expanding contours of equal protection have thrust the federal
courts into the midst of urban renewal. Clearly the abdication of
Berman v. Parker belongs to another day. Though "federal courts can-
not administer the housing" 287 or the urban renewal program, wherever
they sit, "human rights under the Federal Constitution are always a
proper subject for adjudication." 28 Norwalk CORE and other recent
decisions indicate that federal judges are increasingly reluctant to permit
the rich mixture of political and technical issues abounding in urban
renewal to block review of program activity when constitutional ques-
tions require resolution.
Much of this shift in judicial approach to urban planning is due to
the example of the Warren Court, "the revolutionary committee" 289
which has established precedent for facing questions once evaded under
the rubric of justiciability. The expansive approach of federal courts
to equal protection is at war with notions of times past that "there is
not under our Constitution a judicial remedy for every political mischief,
for every undesirable exercise of legislative power." 290
The new dialectic energizing fourteenth amendment exegesis requires
the creation of solutions that transform equal protection into more than
a negative check upon deliberately contrived injustice. Where legisla-
tors and administrators either create or permit constitutional vacuums,
equality may require courts to fill the void. Such a mandate, increasingly
realized in education, voting and criminal justice, inevitably will find
expression in other areas vitally affecting the national life. "Once
loosed, the idea of Equality is not easily cabined." 291 Urban renewal
programs must maintain in equilibrium the larger considerations of the
commonweal with concerns for the poor and powerless. Fidelity to
the planning process does not require indifference to human needs and
suffering.
Under Article III of the Constitution, urban renewal controversies
in many instances are justiciable, for a significant number of "the
claim [s] presented and the relief sought are of the type which admit
of judicial resolution." 292 Urban renewal cases thus far indicate that
287 This phrase was used in Judge Hays' dissenting opinion in Norwalk L See
note 161 supra and accompanying text.
288 Zwvickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967).
2 89 A. BE=U.E, Tih ToMlE FACES OF POWER at vii (1967).
290 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 270 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
291 Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and
the Promotion of Hwnan Rights, 80 HARv. L. REV. 91 (1966).
202
'Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 516 (1969).
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relief can be "judicially molded," 193 that there exist in the planning
process identifiable issues-that can be isolated and dealt with success-
fully, and that these issues need-not turn on the stake'or the standing of
the plaintiff.294
Yet only the naive will not perceive the essential limits of judicial
review. Courts faced with the proposition of dismantling or disrupting
a plan painstakingly pieced together over months and years must inev-
itably opt for some middle ground, fashioning a remedy somehow
consistent with execution of the plan. Prayers for relief should be nar-
rowly framed if they are to be entertained seriously. The courts have
limitations and are not likely to make the difficult choices that ultimately
are determined by considerations of political and economic power.
Often, only abandonment of an existing plan or its drastic revision
will really protect the interests of groups excluded from meaningful
participation in the decision-mdking power apparatus which fashions
urban renewal and allied land use programs. In Pinn v. Rockefeller29
engineering considerations with political overtones threaten to propel
the highway through the hearths of poor blacks, driving them from
Ossining and North Tarrytown. Political and economic realities, part
of any equation, tend to predetermine much of the oppressive impact
of urban renewal.
Allocation of resources is therefore the ultimate issue. Despite the
gathering momentum of c6urtroom legislating,291 this critical aspect of
public power is largely beyond judicial reach. The power of the purse
is still in the firm grasp of legislators. Thus the threat, not the actuality,
of judicial review may be the way in which judges can best insure the
responsiveness of planners, administrators and legislators to considera-
tions which cannot be charted on drawing boards. The increased wil-
lingness of courts to conform land use planning to the requisites of due
process and equal protection is a factor that no agency can ignore.
Judicial vigilance increasingly stands as a viable check to arbitrariness
and injustice in urban renewal.
293 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962).
2
a
4 Scholarship continues to erode the concept and mythology of standing. Cf.
Berger, Stamding to Sue in Public Actions: Is it a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE
LJ. 816, 840 (1969):
In sum, the notion that the constitution demands injury to a personal interest
as a prerequisite to attacks on allegedly unconsitutional action is historically
unfounded.
F95 No. 69 Civ. 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
2b Some"have seen its consummation. "Ultimate legislative power in the United States
has come to rest in the Supreme Court of the United States." A. BmRu, supra note 289,
at 3.
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